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LOSS OF SELF-CONTROL, DUAL-PROCESS 
THEORIES, AND PROVOCATION 
Michal Buchhandler-Raphael* 
 
Contemporary understanding of the provocation defense views the “loss 
of self-control” theory as the cornerstone of this partial excuse.  In 
considering whether to reduce murder charges to manslaughter, juries and 
judges rely on this theory to determine if the defendant lost self-control after 
experiencing intense emotional arousal and if a reasonable person would 
have also likely lost self-control in similar circumstances. 
This Article questions this conventional wisdom by examining the various 
flaws embedded in provocation’s loss of self-control theory.  It argues that 
the theory is both over- and underinclusive.  It is overinclusive because it 
provides a basis for mitigation in cases where leniency is normatively 
unwarranted given policy considerations.  It is also underinclusive because 
it only accommodates the typical reactions of angry defendants who manifest 
sudden impulsivity.  It fails to help defendants who visibly appear calm and 
composed because their emotional arousal was triggered by a host of other 
emotions beyond anger—mostly fear, desperation, and hopelessness. 
This Article turns to psychological research on dual-process models to 
craft an alternative theory underlying the provocation defense.  Drawing on 
these models’ two modes of thinking, it contends that provoked killers’ 
reactions may be understood as the result of emotions that shape actors’ 
judgment and decision-making processes.  The Article uses the term 
“impaired judgment” to refer to these situations.  Acknowledging both the 
promises and the pitfalls of this alternate theory, the Article advances two 
arguments.  First, it posits that the concept of impaired judgment is better 
suited than loss of self-control to support provocation’s doctrinal framework.  
Second, it points to intrinsic limitations embedded in reliance on the loss of 
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self-control theory, which is unable to account for provocation’s normative 
dimension.  The theory must therefore be supplemented with a value-based 
component that would assist juries in determining the circumstances that 
make provocation adequate from a normative and evaluative perspective. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On the night of July 31, 2012, thirty-one-year-old Rebekah Mellon was 
sitting on a couch in the living room of her Phoenix home, smoking a 
cigarette and calmly watching her husband Donald Mellon taking his final 
breaths.1  Surveillance cameras installed in the house showed that, for 
twenty-three minutes, Rebekah witnessed Donald dying as he lay on the floor 
after she had shot him in the head.2  The footage showed that at the time of 
the shooting, Donald was talking on the phone as Rebekah obtained a 
handgun from a cabinet, aimed it at him, and, after a short verbal argument, 
 
 1. Richard Ruelas, What Made This Woman Shoot Her Husband Dead?, ARIZ. REPUBLIC 
(Jan. 3, 2017, 8:17 AM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/phoenix-best-reads/ 
2017/01/03/phoenix-woman-rebekah-mellon-shoot-her-husband-dead/92732054/ [https:// 
perma.cc/URZ3-3NUD]. 
 2. Id.  The defendant, Rebekah, stated that the deceased installed security cameras in the 
home because he wanted to watch her whereabouts at all times.  Prosecutors disputed this 
account, saying that the deceased installed the cameras after their former house was 
burglarized. Id. 
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shot him.3  It further showed that Donald was unarmed and that no physical 
altercation between him and Rebekah preceded the shooting.4 
The same surveillance cameras captured not only the shooting itself and 
the subsequent chilling episode but also some of the events that transpired 
before the day of the fatal incident, including Donald’s multiple physical 
abuses of Rebekah.5  Rebekah claimed that during the course of seven years 
of marriage, she was a victim of domestic violence.6  She said Donald would 
get drunk, throw her on the ground, and choke her and that the abuse had 
further escalated over the years.7  Rebekah also said Donald constantly 
exhibited controlling behavior, and when she tried to leave him, he “shot her 
iPod, broke her phone, and locked her inside the home.”8  Some incidents of 
physical abuse were also documented in police reports.9  Rebekah was 
initially charged with first-degree murder.10  Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
she pleaded guilty to second-degree murder.11  The judge accepted the plea 
and sentenced her to twenty years in prison.12 
Now consider how the case would have played out had it gone to trial.  The 
defense’s theory would have likely been that the defendant had shot the 
deceased because she had feared that he would have killed her.  Based on the 
deceased’s prolonged physical abuse of the defendant, the defense would 
have likely requested that the jury be instructed on self-defense.  The jury, 
however, would have likely rejected this claim because surveillance footage 
shows that, at the time of the shooting, the deceased presented no danger to 
the defendant and therefore her use of deadly force against the deceased was 
not immediately necessary.13 
The defense attorney would have also likely requested the court to instruct 
the jury on manslaughter on the theory that the deceased’s behavior provoked 
 
 3. See id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. For example, in 2011, police arrived at their residence after someone had pushed the 
panic button. Id.  Mouthing the words “help me” to the police officer who interviewed her,  
Rebekah told him that the deceased threatened, intimidated, and physically abused her on a 
daily basis. Id.  But when police informed the defendant that they had arrested the deceased 
on assault charges, she became upset and said, “He is gonna kill me.” Id. 
 10. See Richard Ruelas, Sentencing Set for Woman Who Shot Husband, Smoked While He 
Died, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Jan. 11, 2017, 12:11 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/ 
local/phoenix-breaking/2017/01/11/rebekah-mellon-phoenix-woman-who-shot-her-husband-
and-smoked-while-he-died-pleads-guilty/96450378/ [https://perma.cc/4ETY-RTWY]. 
 11. Id.  In a memorandum filed with the court, Mellon’s defense attorney said that, if the 
case had gone to trial, she would have argued self-defense as she feared for her life because 
of the prolonged physical abuse by the deceased. Id. 
 12. Press Release, Maricopa Cty. Att’y’s Office, Rebekah Mellon Pled to 2nd Degree 
Murder for Shooting Her Husband in 2012 (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.maricopacounty 
attorney.org/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=426 [https://perma.cc/P9LG-4QHM]. 
 13. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-404 (2020) (“A person is justified in threatening or using 
physical force against another when and to the extent a reasonable person would believe that 
physical force is immediately necessary . . . .”). 
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the defendant.  A provocation defense, however, would not have fared better 
given the circumstances underlying the shooting.  In Arizona, a second-
degree murder may be mitigated to manslaughter if the defendant committed 
the killing “upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate 
provocation by the victim.”14  But the statute further defines “adequate 
provocation” as “conduct or circumstances sufficient to deprive a reasonable 
person of self-control.”15  Consequently, Arizona courts require defendants 
to introduce evidence that the deceased’s provoking behavior caused them to 
lose self-control.16  The court would have likely refused to instruct the jury 
on manslaughter, reasoning that the footage documenting the defendant’s 
actions demonstrated that she acted with complete self-control.  Far from 
appearing distraught, emotionally overwrought, or hysterical, the defendant’s 
behavior was seemingly the epitome of a woman who maintained self-
control.17  The court would have likely placed a premium on the fact that, at 
the time of the killing, the defendant appeared neither visibly angry nor 
fearful and that she had maintained her composure before, during, and after 
the shooting.  The court would have likely stressed that the footage supported 
the inference that the homicide was motivated by the defendant’s desire for 
revenge against the deceased, namely, a calculated retaliatory act following 
prolonged physical abuse. 
Given the insurmountable difficulties in establishing a mitigating defense, 
the defendant’s decision to plead guilty to second-degree murder, rather than 
risk a trial in which the jury would have been exposed to the graphic images 
of the shooting and its aftermath, arguably seemed like a sound defense 
strategy.  While jurors might offer leniency to defendants whom they 
perceive as abuse victims who suddenly lost self-control, Rebekah Mellon 
seems a far cry from this case and therefore, an unlikely candidate for 
compassion. 
Arizona is not alone in its insistence that provocation must result in the 
defendant’s loss of self-control.  Contemporary understanding of the 
provocation defense is mostly grounded on the theory that defendants kill 
 
 14. Id. § 13-1103(A)(2). 
 15. Id. § 13-1101(4). 
 16. See, e.g., State v. Roberson, No. 2 CA–CR 2011–0224, 2012 WL 3061644, at *2–3 
(Ariz. Ct. App. July 27, 2012) (rejecting the defendant’s claims that he had been provoked by 
the deceased and holding that his defense was inconsistent with the finding that he had been 
provoked by the deceased such that a reasonable person in his situation would have been 
deprived of self-control); State v. Hernandez, No. 2 CA–CR 2009–0232, 2010 WL 3341283, 
at *2 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2010) (The defendant had not introduced any evidence 
demonstrating that the deceased’s actions provoked him, causing him to lose his self-control 
and shoot the deceased.  Instead, the record showed that he acted rationally and with purpose.  
The court stressed that the defendant’s own testimony indicated that he claimed that he was 
scared of the deceased, tried to get away from him, shot out of fear to defend himself, which 
is incompatible with a provocation claim.). 
 17. Courts take into consideration not only the defendant’s behavior at the time of the 
killing but also behavior following the killing itself. See, e.g., State v. Bernhardt, 372 P.3d 
1161, 1174 (Kan. 2016) (citing evidence that even if, at the time of the killing, the defendant’s 
behavior was impulsive, the defendant’s behavior after the killing appeared cold and callous 
rather than impulsive). 
2020] DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES AND PROVACATION 1819 
after suddenly losing self-control, immediately after being provoked by the 
deceased.18  Common law has long recognized that murder charges may be 
mitigated to voluntary manslaughter if there is evidence that the defendant 
acted in a sudden heat of passion, stemming from adequate provocation, 
without an opportunity to cool off.19  Admittedly, traditional provocation 
doctrine did not make the defendant’s loss of self-control an element of the 
defense.20  Conceptualization of the defense, however, has significantly 
evolved over the years, shifting the emphasis from provocation’s adequacy 
towards the defendant’s loss of self-control.21  Even jurisdictions that did not 
adopt a reformulated version of provocation, such as the defense of extreme 
mental and emotional disturbance (EMED), incorporated the notion of loss 
of self-control into one of the defense’s requirements, largely by stating, 
legislatively or judicially, that provocation is adequate when a reasonable 
person would have similarly lost self-control.22 
Today, loss of self-control is commonly perceived as the cornerstone of 
the modern provocation defense.23  This concept not only captures 
provocation’s key requirement and its underlying rationale but is also 
consistent with provoked killers’ own narratives and with the behavioral 
manifestations that judges and juries expect to find in such defendants.  
Likewise, the image of an “out of control” perpetrator dominates both the 
criminal law and the public’s imagination.  To name just a couple examples 
demonstrating the ways that this vision is reinforced in popular culture, 
consider the popularity of true crime documentary-style series like Snapped 
and Deadly Women, which largely focus on female killers who killed 
intimate partners after allegedly losing self-control.24 
This Article casts doubt on the criminal justice system’s characterization 
of provocation as grounded in the loss of self-control theory by examining 
the various flaws in this account.  Case law illustrates that the theory is not 
only vague and unhelpful but also confusing and misleading.25  The concept 
of loss of self-control is overly broad because most crimes may fairly be 
characterized as resulting from control failures and most criminal defendants 
may plausibly be viewed as “out of control.”26  The concept is thus merely 
descriptive, lacking any normative component that is capable of drawing the 
boundary between defendants deserving of murder convictions and less 
culpable defendants who should be convicted of lesser crimes.27  The concept 
 
 18. See infra Part I. 
 19. See infra Part I. 
 20. See infra Part I. 
 21. See infra Part I. 
 22. See infra Part I. 
 23. See Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress:  Modern Law Reform and the Provocation 
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1340 (1997). 
 24. See generally Deadly Women (Discovery Channel television broadcast 2005); 
Snapped (Oxygen television broadcast 2004). 
 25. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
 26. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Crime, Punishment, and the Psychology of Self-
Control, 61 EMORY L.J. 501, 505 (2012). 
 27. Id. at 519. 
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is also indiscriminate because it is unable to provide decision makers with 
any operational guidelines on which types of control failures warrant 
mitigation. 
Given these shortcomings, courts’ reliance on the loss of self-control 
theory as the basis of provocation has resulted in a defense that is both over- 
and underinclusive.  Feminist scholars denounce the defense on the grounds 
that it is overinclusive to the detriment of female victims because it gives jury 
instructions on manslaughter for men who kill their female intimate partners 
attempting to terminate the relationship.28  Emphasizing defendants’ loss of 
self-control thus results in bringing provocation claims before juries in 
circumstances where mitigation is normatively unjustified.29  But 
commentators’ hostility towards provocation claims that are grounded in loss 
of self-control, especially in their perception that it harms women, impedes 
any doctrinal developments, including the advancement of an alternative 
construct that would also benefit female defendants.30 
One of the upshots of the pervasive critique that the provocation doctrine 
is overinclusive is that commentators fail to recognize that the defense may 
also prove underinclusive in cases where overwhelming emotions other than 
anger, mostly fear and desperation, triggered the provocation.31  Specifically, 
defendants who overreacted to the deceaseds’ physical threats often do not 
receive jury instructions on manslaughter because their reactions do not 
visibly appear to result from a sudden loss of self-control.32  In fact, fearful 
killers may seem to possess self-control, erroneously making the homicide 
look like a cold, premeditated, and deliberate act of calculated revenge rather 
than an impulsive loss of self-control.33  The loss of self-control requirement 
thus accommodates mostly defendants who manifest behavior characterized 
as acting “out of control,” but it is not responsive to many provoked killers, 
including women, who instead appear calm, composed, and in control.  While 
mitigation might have been normatively warranted, the latter defendants are 
denied jury instructions on manslaughter.34  In short, provocation’s loss of 
self-control theory, initially lauded as a promising overhaul of an archaic 
defense, has collapsed, leaving the defense on shaky doctrinal grounds. 
This Article proposes a remedy to the drawbacks stemming from 
provocation laws’ reliance on loss of self-control theory by considering the 
alternative theory of impaired judgment to support the conceptual foundation 
of the defense.  Professor Stephen Morse has long rejected the notion of loss 
of self-control, suggesting instead that the criminal law should adopt a 
generic excuse of partial responsibility that would be grounded in the concept 
 
 28. See infra Part II.A. 
 29. See infra Part II.A. 
 30. See Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Fear-Based Provocation, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1719, 
1737 (2018). 
 31. See infra Part II.B. 
 32. See infra Part II.B. 
 33. See infra Part II.B. 
 34. See infra Part II.B. 
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of diminished rationality and applicable to all crimes.35  But this alternative 
notion of diminished rationality suffers from conceptual shortcomings that 
make it an inadequate conceptual framework for underlying the provocation 
defense.36  Here, this Article partially draws on Morse’s ideas by arguing that 
the provocation defense indeed should not be grounded in the concept of loss 
of self-control.  Yet, it disagrees with Morse’s suggestion that the defense is 
best understood as grounded in the theory of diminished rationality.  Instead, 
the provocation defense ought to be grounded in the notion of impaired 
judgment, by drawing on psychological research that conceptualizes 
provocation as one instance of impaired judgment.37 
In recent years, legal scholars began delving into the implications of 
psychological studies on reshaping the scope of criminal responsibility, 
including revisiting the contours of the provocation defense.38  For example, 
commentators consider the insights that psychological research on control 
failures may offer for criminal law theory and doctrine in general and its 
implications for the scope of the provocation defense in particular.39  This 
Article accepts commentators’ invitation to consider psychological research 
for the purpose of reconstructing the provocation defense in accordance with 
empirical evidence but departs from its conclusion that criminal law doctrine 
should draw on the psychological concept of self-control.  Instead, this 
Article considers the ways in which a myriad of intense emotions, including 
anger and fear, might impair individuals’ judgment.  In turn, this might also 
result in lethal aggression, as supported by psychological research on 
judgment and decision-making, particularly dual-process theories. 
Cognitive psychologists developed dual-process theories to explain two 
ways of thinking:  one is fast, intuitive, emotional, and irrational, and the 
other slow, deliberate, and rational.40  These theories define diminished 
rationality as a shortfall in behavior compared to fully instrumental 
rationality.41  While dual-process theories initially developed to explain 
economic behavior, they carry extensive ramifications for various other 
areas.  Criminal law scholars, however, have yet to consider the significance 
of these theories for the scope of criminal responsibility in general and for 
rethinking excuse defenses, such as provocation, in particular. 
This Article considers the implications of psychological research on the 
provocation defense by making two key arguments.  First, it posits that the 
notion of impaired judgment offers a broad-based doctrinal framework for 
provocation and should therefore replace the misguided loss of self-control 
 
 35. See Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 289, 296–97 (2003). 
 36. See infra Parts III.B–C. 
 37. See infra Part III.C. 
 38. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 26, at 530–31. 
 39. Id. at 525–26. 
 40. See infra Part III.A. 
 41. See Robert D. Cooter & Michael D. Gilbert, Constitutional Law and Economics, in 
RESEARCH METHODS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  A HANDBOOK (Malcolm Langford & David 
S. Law eds., forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3123253 [https://perma.cc/2M5R-EW64]. 
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paradigm that currently underpins provocation laws.  Grounding provocation 
claims in the concept of impaired judgment would extend the defense to 
different types of defendants that the loss of self-control theory fails to help, 
including fearful killers like Rebekah Mellon.42  Second, the Article argues 
that, while the advantages of such psychological research are invaluable, it 
has some intrinsic limits for the purpose of revisiting provocation’s scope.  
Provocation’s adequacy element calls for normative evaluations, which rest 
on a combination of policy considerations, communities’ shared values, 
contemporary cultural norms, and moral principles rather than on 
empiricism.43  While dual-process theories support provocation’s subjective 
prong, that is, the defendant’s extreme emotional arousal, they are unable to 
offer any insights for shaping provocation’s objective component, namely its 
normative dimension.  A reformulated provocation defense, which is 
grounded in the notion of impaired judgment, must incorporate some value-
based elements to direct decision makers’ inquiries into the normative 
question of who among defendants deserve mitigation.  Specifically, 
defendants do not deserve to be stigmatized and punished as murderers when 
they were provoked by the deceased’s wrongful act. 
The Article proceeds as follows:  Part I outlines the role that the loss of 
self-control theory currently plays in underpinning modern understanding of 
the provocation defense as reflected in scholarly writings and courts’ 
decisions.  Part II elaborates on the pitfalls of provocation’s loss of self-
control theory, which result in a defense that is both over- and underinclusive.  
Drawing on an analogy to the widespread rejection of loss of self-control 
theory in the insanity defense area, this Part further posits that this theory 
should similarly be dismissed in the provocation context.  Part III examines 
the concept of impaired judgment as an alternative to the loss of self-control 
theory.  It begins with a general discussion of psychological research on dual-
process theories, then contemplates its implications for the provocation 
defense.  Part IV first acknowledges the intrinsic limits of psychological 
research for deciding what types of defendants whose decision-making and 
judgment processes have been impaired might deserve mitigation.  Next, it 
considers the addition of a policy-based component that would assist juries 
in determining the circumstances that make provocation adequate from a 
normative perspective. 
I.  LOSS OF SELF-CONTROL THEORY UNDER EXISTING LAW 
Grounded in a retributivist position of “just desert,” the rationale 
underlying the provocation defense is that provoked actors kill because they 
lose self-control.44  It is the loss of self-control that makes them less morally 
 
 42. See supra text accompanying notes 1–12. 
 43. See Morse, supra note 35, at 299 nn.21–22 (contending that normative judgments 
should be made by jurors at the guilt phase rather than by judges at sentencing). 
 44. See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Desert, Punishment, and Criminal Responsibility, 49 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 71 (1986) (discussing the retributivist theory of punishment and the role 
of the victim’s guilt in provocation as a basis for reduced sentence). 
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culpable than unprovoked killers and thus deserving of reduced 
punishment.45  This position implicitly acknowledges the actor’s motive for 
the crime because it assumes that people who kill in response to provocation 
by the deceased have a less blameworthy motive than those killing for other 
motives, such as greed or revenge.46  The defendant’s loss of self-control is 
perceived as a somewhat understandable motive compared to, for example, 
killing motivated by revenge, which modern societal values denounce as 
deplorable.47 
Existing provocation laws significantly vary by jurisdiction, making it 
difficult to generalize about the defense’s precise elements.  Broadly 
speaking, a majority of jurisdictions retain the essence of common law’s 
“heat of passion” defense.48  In these jurisdictions, murder charges are 
typically mitigated to voluntary manslaughter when three requirements are 
met:  (1) a subjective prong requires that the defendant kill while in a sudden 
heat of passion; (2) an objective prong requires that the passion was the result 
of adequate provocation; and (3) the defendant did not have an opportunity 
to cool off.49 
At first blush, current formulations that draw on the traditional provocation 
defense do not explicitly adopt any language requiring proof that the 
provoked actor had lost self-control.50  The loss of self-control requirement, 
however, is deeply embedded in the defense in various ways.  The concept 
of loss of self-control is often used by courts when explaining the test to 
determine when provocation is sufficiently severe and objectively 
reasonable.51  Courts hold that provocation is adequate only when a 
 
 45. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 530–41 (7th ed. 2016). 
 46. See Douglas Husak, “Broad” Culpability and the Retributivist Dream, 9 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 449, 475–76 (2012). 
 47. See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing:  Men Who Batter, Men Who 
Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 104–05 (1992) (noting that a retaliatory killing 
is antithetical to the doctrinal understanding of voluntary manslaughter and that revenge 
killings are marked by cool calculation as opposed to hot-blooded killing). 
 48. DRESSLER, supra note 45, at 530. 
 49. Id. (nothing that, additionally, there must be a causal link between the provocation, 
the passion, and the killing).  This Article uses the terms “manslaughter” and “voluntary 
manslaughter” interchangeably as jurisdictions that amended their penal codes use the term 
“manslaughter,” while jurisdictions that retain the traditional common-law offense use the 
term “voluntary manslaughter.” 
 50. Some jurisdictions that do not use loss of self-control language rely instead on the 
concept of “irresistible passion.” See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2(a) (2020) (“A person 
commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter when he causes the death of another human 
being under circumstances which would otherwise be murder and if he acts solely as the result 
of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to 
excite such passion in a reasonable person; however, if there should have been an interval 
between the provocation and the killing sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be 
heard, of which the jury in all cases shall be the judge, the killing shall be attributed to 
deliberate revenge and be punished as murder.”).  A plausible argument could be made that 
the irresistible passion and loss of self-control are synonymous concepts in this context, as 
defendants who could not resist their impulse to kill necessarily lost their ability to exercise 
self-control. 
 51. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5404(a)(1) (2020) (“Voluntary manslaughter is 
knowingly killing a human being committed upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of 
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reasonable or ordinary person would have similarly lost control as a result of 
the provocation.52  Other times, the loss of self-control theory is integrated 
into jury instructions on manslaughter, explaining that inadequate 
provocation is one that would not have caused a reasonable person to have 
lost self-control.53  Still, other jurisdictions incorporate the loss of self-
control theory into the cooling-off requirement, for example, by stating that 
the defendant must have killed before there was an interval between the 
provocation and the killing in which a person of ordinary reason and 
temperament would regain control and suppress the impulse to kill.54 
Jurisdictions also vary on whether defendants must establish complete loss 
of self-control in order to prevail on a provocation claim.  In some 
jurisdictions, provoked killers do not need to prove complete inability to 
control their behavior.55  Instead, defendants must demonstrate that ordinary 
individuals in similar circumstances would have also been similarly 
provoked.56  Yet other jurisdictions go as far as requiring the defendant to 
 
passion . . . .”).  When discussing whether a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction should 
have been given, Kansas courts use loss of self-control language. See, e.g., State v. Hayes, 327 
P.3d 414, 418 (Kan. 2014) (noting that a key element of voluntary manslaughter is provocation 
that is “sufficient to cause an ordinary man to lose control of his actions and his reason” 
(quoting State v. Gallegos, 190 P.3d 226, 231 (Kan. 2008))); State v. Henson, 197 P.3d 456, 
463 (Kan. 2008) (“The test for whether severe provocation exists is objective, and the 
provocation must be sufficient to cause an ordinary person to lose control of his or her actions 
or reason.”); see also State v. Shane, 590 N.E.2d 272, 276 (Ohio 1992) (explaining that for 
provocation to be reasonably sufficient to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter “it must 
be sufficient to arouse the passions of an ordinary person beyond the power of his or her 
control”). 
 52. People v. Mendoza, 664 N.W.2d 685, 690 (Mich. 2003); People v. Pouncey, 471 
N.W.2d 346, 350 (Mich. 1991). 
 53. State v. Adamcik, 272 P.3d 417, 448 (Idaho 2012) (affirming the trial court’s jury 
instruction of malice aforethought as “[t]he defendant deliberately intended to kill as a result 
of provocation which the jury determines would not have caused a reasonable person to have 
lost his self-control and reason”). 
 54. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 707.4 (2020) (“[A] person commits voluntary manslaughter 
when that person causes the death of another person, under circumstances which would 
otherwise be murder, if the person causing the death acts solely as a result of sudden, violent, 
and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in 
a person and there is not an interval between the provocation and the killing in which a person 
of ordinary reason and temperament would regain control and suppress the impulse to kill.”); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5404; State v. Chavez-Aguilar, 253 P.3d 362, 370 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) 
(upholding the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter on the theory 
that there was plenty of time for the defendant to reflect on his actions after the fight with the 
deceased and to regain self-control);  People v. Sullivan, 586 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1998) (stating that among the elements of provocation is the requirement that “the 
provocation must be adequate, namely, that which would cause a reasonable person to lose 
control”). 
 55. See Paul Litton, Is Psychological Research on Self-Control Relevant to Criminal 
Law?, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 725, 733 (2014). 
 56. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal 
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 305–06, 305 n.148 (1996) (observing that the provocation 
defense does not require complete loss of self-control). 
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establish evidence of complete inability to exercise self-control.57  These 
courts stress that for provocation to be objectively reasonable, defendants 
must show that they had lost all control and were unable to refrain from 
committing the homicide.58  They further observe the extreme nature of the 
defendant’s mental state, noting that a complete lack of self-control is “an 
extreme mental disturbance or emotional state[,] . . . a state in which a 
person’s ability to exercise judgment is overcome to the extent that the person 
acts uncontrollably.”59  Consequently, in jurisdictions that require complete 
lack of self-control, severe impairment in the ability to exercise self-control 
does not suffice to establish provocation.60 
The role that the loss of self-control theory plays in the provocation 
defense becomes even more apparent in jurisdictions with recently revised 
penal codes.  Under modern manslaughter statutes, the defendant’s loss of 
self-control is often an explicit element of the offense.61  Beginning in the 
second half of the twentieth century and culminating in the years following 
the publication of the commentary to the Model Penal Code (MPC), the 
subjective prong of the defense—killing while in a heat of passion—turned 
into a requirement that the defendant had lost self-control at the time of the 
killing.62  Even jurisdictions that did not adopt EMED were heavily 
influenced by the MPC commentary, which placed a premium on the notion 
of loss of self-control.63  These jurisdictions either revised their manslaughter 
statutes, stating that provocation is adequate if it causes a reasonable or 
 
 57. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 939.44(1)(b) (2020) (“‘Provocation’ means something which 
the defendant reasonably believes the intended victim has done which causes the defendant to 
lack self-control completely at the time of causing death.”). 
 58. People v. Brown, No. 249896, 2004 WL 2601712, at *1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 
2004) (upholding the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter and 
noting that there was no evidence that the defendant lost all control and was unable to act 
deliberately). 
 59. State v. Spooner, No. 2015AP2089-CR, 2017 WL 2774491, at *7 (Wis. Ct. App. June 
27, 2017). 
 60. Commentators believe that provocation does not require complete loss of self-control 
and that provocation mitigates punishment because it impairs the actor’s volition. See Kahan 
& Nussbaum, supra note 56, at 305–06. 
 61. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1101, 13-1103 (2020) (“‘Adequate 
provocation’ means conduct or circumstances sufficient to deprive a reasonable person of self-
control.”); id. § 13-1103(A)(2) (“[A person commits manslaughter by] committing second 
degree murder as defined in section 13-1104, subsection A upon a sudden quarrel or heat of 
passion resulting from adequate provocation by the victim.”); see also MINN. STAT. 
§ 609.20(1) (2020) (“[Whoever] intentionally causes the death of another person in the heat 
of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would provoke a person of ordinary 
self-control under like circumstances, provided that the crying of a child does not constitute 
provocation”); WIS. STAT. § 939.44 (defining “adequate” as “sufficient to cause complete lack 
of self-control in an ordinarily constituted person” and defining “provocation” as “something 
which the defendant reasonably believes the intended victim has done which causes the 
defendant to lack self-control completely at the time of causing death”). 
 62. See Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 
601, 650. 
 63. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1340 n.54. 
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ordinary person to lose self-control, or judicially interpreted provocation to 
require the defendant’s loss of self-control.64 
While the precise role that the loss of self-control theory plays in 
jurisdictions whose provocation defense is formulated after the traditional 
heat of passion defense arguably varies, the theory is undoubtedly the 
cornerstone of EMED.65  Adopted only in a minority of jurisdictions, EMED 
requires both a subjective element under which the defendant killed while 
experiencing extreme mental or emotional disturbance and an objective 
element requiring that there is a “reasonable explanation or excuse” for this 
extreme mental state (as opposed to an explanation or excuse for the killing 
itself).66  EMED provides a much broader basis for mitigation compared to 
the common law’s heat of passion defense since the concept of extreme 
emotional disturbance encompasses a wide array of circumstances under 
which intense emotions cause defendants to lose self-control.67  EMED does 
not require any specific provocative incident to establish the defense.68  
Furthermore, it requires neither a sudden, single incident to trigger the 
emotional disturbance nor a cooling off period.69  Instead, the defense is 
sufficiently broad to recognize that extreme emotional disturbance may result 
from a series of cumulative incidents that may build up over an extended 
period, in which the defendant’s intense emotions never subsided.70  
Moreover, unlike the heat-of-passion defense, which is mostly perceived as 
an anger-based defense, EMED recognizes that additional emotions, 
including fear, may trigger the defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance.71 
While the defense’s statutory language refers only to extreme emotional 
disturbance rather than loss of self-control, courts in EMED jurisdictions 
routinely rely on the notion of the defendant’s loss of self-control to explain 
the defense’s subjective element.72  For example, courts observe that “[a] 
defendant cannot establish an extreme emotional disturbance defense without 
evidence that he or she suffered from a mental infirmity not rising to the level 
of insanity at the time of the homicide, typically manifested by a loss of self-
 
 64. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (providing examples of statutory adoption 
of loss of self-control); see also State v. Johnson, 236 P.3d 517, 522–24 (Kan. 2010) 
(providing examples of judicial adoption of the loss of self-control requirement by Kansas 
courts). 
 65. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1340. 
 66. DRESSLER, supra note 45, at 545–46. 
 67. The MPC’s EMED defense combines two separate bases for mitigation:  (1) the 
emotional disturbance prong, which follows the steps of the common law’s heat of passion 
defense, even if significantly expanding it and rejecting its rigid limits, and (2) the extreme 
mental disturbance prong, which is one form of diminished mental capacity, or partial 
responsibility, under the common law, reserved for mental diseases and disturbances falling 
short of a full-blown insanity defense. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming 
Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 827 n.114 (2003). 
 68. See Denno, supra note 62, at 651. 
 69. Id. 
 70. People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 908 (N.Y. 1976). 
 71. People v. Roldan, 647 N.Y.S.2d 179, 184 (App. Div. 1996). 
 72. See, e.g., State v. Lambdin, 424 P.3d 117, 125–26 (Utah 2017). 
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control.”73  Other courts note that, to establish extreme emotional 
disturbance, defendants must demonstrate that they acted with “a temporary 
state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one’s 
judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from [an] impelling force 
of the extreme emotional disturbance.”74 
In short, despite variation among different jurisdictions on the provocation 
defense’s precise requirements, contemporary understanding of the defense 
heavily draws on the loss of self-control theory to explain the defendant’s 
subjective mental state, even in jurisdictions that do not make the defendant’s 
loss of self-control an explicit element of the defense.75 
The loss of self-control theory also figures prominently in scholarly 
writings on the provocation defense.  While commentators cannot agree on a 
single way to describe the defense, often using different formulations to 
characterize it and debating whether it ought to be understood as a partial 
excuse or partial justification, most commentators agree that the notion of 
loss of self-control is a key part of the defense.76  For example, Professor 
Joshua Dressler observes that the underlying rationale for the provocation 
defense is based on the idea of the defendant’s partial loss of self-control.77  
 
 73. People v. Roche, 772 N.E.2d 1133, 1138–40 (N.Y. 2002) (concluding that the 
defendant was not entitled to a jury instruction on manslaughter based on emotional 
disturbance because he did not claim that he suffered from a loss of self-control). 
 74. Spears v. Commonwealth, 448 S.W.3d 781, 790 (Ky. 2014) (quoting McClellan v. 
Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468 (Ky. 1986)). 
 75. To be clear, in both common law and MPC jurisdictions, the defendant’s loss of 
control standing alone is not sufficient to warrant a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter.  
An objective element is always necessary.  While EMED requires a reasonable explanation 
for the extreme emotional disturbance, common-law provocation leaves the jury to decide 
under which circumstances the defendant was adequately provoked.  But establishing the 
defendant’s loss of self-control is often a necessary prerequisite for considering whether 
provocation’s objective requirement has been met. See People v. Dorch, No. 328119, 2016 
WL 6992233, at *1–3 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2016) (holding that the defendant, who 
claimed that he killed the deceased out of fear that a group of people were about to attack him, 
did not lose control but rather acted out of reason and with control). 
 76. For a comprehensive summary of the extensive scholarly debate about whether 
provocation is a partial excuse or partial justification, see generally Mitchell N. Berman & Ian 
P. Farrell, Provocation Manslaughter as Partial Justification and Partial Excuse, 52 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1027 (2011).  While the majority of commentators view provocation as 
grounded in a loss of self-control rationale, a minority position rejects this view.  Professor 
Stephen Morse expresses the most prominent position opposing the loss of self-control theory. 
See Morse, supra note 35, at 295–96.  Morse argues that different actors have different 
capacities for rational thinking and advocates for a general excuse defense based on 
diminished rationality. Id.  Morse notes that the provocation defense ought to be understood 
as one example of diminished rationality, but his broader theory captures a host of 
circumstances where actors’ rationality is diminished, including due to mental disorders. Id.  
The diminished rationality theory that Morse advocates is not individually applied to the 
specific features of the provocation defense. See id.; see also Stephen J. Morse, Rationality 
and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 251, 255 (2000) (defining rational thought as requiring 
three elements:  (1) the ability to perceive accurately, to get the facts right; (2) the ability to 
form justifiable beliefs; and (3) the ability to reason instrumentally, weighing the facts 
appropriately and according to a minimally coherent order of preferences). 
 77. See Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?:  Some Reflections on a 
Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 974 (2002) (noting that the modern defense of 
provocation is about excusable loss of control and that the defendant does not need to fully 
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Based on the premise that provocation is all about emotions and human 
imperfections, Dressler posits that the defense is concerned with “impaired 
capacity for self-control.”78  He further notes that we punish a person who 
kills upon provocation because “[h]e did not control himself as much as he 
should have, or as much as common experience tells us he could have, nor 
as much as the ordinarily law-abiding person would have.”79  Psychology 
and law professor Reid Fontaine adds that the defense ought to be understood 
in excusatory terms as a provoked actor reacts to substantial emotional upset, 
without which he would not have lost self-control.80 
Other commentators also stress the centrality of the notion of loss of self-
control to contemporary understanding of the provocation defense.  Professor 
Victoria Nourse observes that the modern emphasis on the loss of self-control 
theory represents a conceptual shift from the common law’s perception of 
provocation as a partial justification towards viewing it as a partial excuse.81  
Traditional provocation, her argument continues, was limited only to 
predefined categories, whereas the contemporary view of the defense 
recognizes a host of circumstances that may result in defendants’ loss of 
control.82  Professors Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum further observe that, 
while traditional common law emphasized victims’ wrongdoing to establish 
the adequacy of provocation, de-emphasizing the defendant’s volitional 
impairment, provocation laws’ modern trend is to reemphasize the notion of 
loss of self-control.83 
Despite general agreement that the concept of loss of control is crucial to 
modern views of the provocation defense, commentators disagree on the 
precise role that it plays in constructing provocation laws.  Some 
commentators contend that, today, loss of self-control is a distinct element of 
the provocation defense.  Professor Stephen Garvey, for example, notes that 
the defense consists of three requirements:  (1) adequate provocation; (2) 
passion; and (3) reasonable loss of self-control.84  Yet others argue that loss 
of self-control is not a separate element of the defense.  For example, 
Professors Mitchell Berman and Ian Farrell disagree with Garvey’s 
description of “reasonable loss of self-control” as an independent element.85  
Making it an additional requirement conflates the defense’s two separate 
 
lose control but instead may experience substantial impairment of his capacity for self-
control). 
 78. Id. at 978–79. 
 79. Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion:  A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 467 (1982). 
 80. See Reid Griffith Fontaine, Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as 
Excuse Not Justification, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 27, 45–47 (2009). 
 81. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1339. 
 82. See id. at 1339–40. 
 83. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 56, at 315 (noting that, while contemporary 
provocation focuses on volitional impairment, the authors support an evaluative view which 
is more consistent with de-emphasizing volitional impairment). 
 84. See Stephen P. Garvey, Passion’s Puzzle, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1677, 1691 (2005) (adding 
a fourth requirement that describes the effect of the defense:  mitigation rather than acquittal). 
 85. See Berman & Farrell, supra note 76, at 1042–43. 
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elements, namely, that (1) the defendant acted following a passionate 
emotion of a kind and to a degree that interferes with the defendant’s ability 
to exercise self-control and (2) provocation is adequate if it would provoke 
an ordinary, reasonable, or average person.86  According to them, 
provocation does not explicitly use the loss of control language or make it a 
separate element.  Instead, the notion of loss of self-control is used to explain 
the passion element as an emotional response that impairs the defendant’s 
ability to exercise self-control.87 
This brief overview of the provocation defense demonstrates that the 
defense is mostly described in judicial opinions and scholarly accounts as 
predicated on the notion of loss of self-control.88  Additionally, the loss of 
self-control paradigm overshadows not only jurists’ treatment of the defense 
but also societal expectations.  Recurring depictions of killers in popular 
culture further contribute to the prevalent narrative that provoked 
perpetrators lost self-control.89  The portrait of an actor who is out of control 
is deeply entrenched in society’s psyche to the extent that it necessarily 
constructs juries’ perceptions of the types of provoked killers who merit 
mitigation of punishment.  Society is willing to regard provoked killers as 
less morally blameworthy because it concedes that, in some circumstances, 
individuals are so overwhelmed by intense emotions that most ordinary 
people in the same predicament would similarly lose self-control.  But the 
near-consensus that loss of self-control is provocation’s focal point should 
not stop us from calling into question the wisdom of this familiar account and 
revealing its limitations and deficiencies.  The following Part turns to 
examine what is wrong with provocation’s loss of self-control paradigm. 
II.  THE PITFALLS OF LOSS OF SELF-CONTROL THEORY 
The wide range of defendants claiming to have been provoked to kill and 
the substantial variance in the circumstances underlying their offenses cast 
doubt on whether the loss of self-control theory is best suited to support 
provocation’s doctrinal framework.  The sections below demonstrate that the 
notion of loss of self-control is not only unhelpful in its use of confusing 
terminology but is also misleading for the purpose of determining the scope 
of the provocation defense.  Part II.A argues that reliance on the loss of self-
control theory sometimes results in an overinclusive application of the 
provocation defense, yet other times in an underinclusive one, as Part II.B 
argues.  Part II.C explores the rise and fall of the loss of self-control theory 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 1043. 
 88. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1339–40 (“Modern theories of provocation assume that 
passion knows no specific circumstances, but may arise in any situation.  We partially excuse 
defendants who kill in passion because they lacked self-control . . . .  MPC commentary 
helped to solidify and legitimize a theory of the defense based on self-control that was far 
more influential than the draft itself.”). 
 89. See Aya Gruber, A Provocative Defense, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 283–84 (2015) 
(discussing popular culture depictions of provoked killers as actors who “snapped”). 
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under the insanity defense and questions why this rejected theory continues 
to play a pivotal role under the provocation defense. 
A.  Loss of Self-Control Theory Is Overinclusive 
Commentators have long noted that the contemporary understanding of 
provocation’s loss of self-control theory is too expansive, resulting in courts 
giving manslaughter jury instructions in cases where mitigation is 
unwarranted.90  The most powerful attack on the provocation defense, often 
referred to as the “feminist critique,” stresses the gender-based implications 
of an overly broad view of loss of self-control theory and its detrimental 
effect on female victims of male violence.91  The loss of self-control theory, 
the argument continues, allows controlling men to receive manslaughter jury 
instructions in cases where they claimed to have lost self-control after their 
female intimate partner attempted to end the relationship.92 
Commentators further lament that the loss of self-control theory is unable 
to distinguish between actors who genuinely cannot control their violent 
behavior (or, at the least, their ability to control such behavior is significantly 
undermined) and actors who simply fail to control their violent impulses.93  
Professor Donna Coker notes that professionals working with abusive men 
who battered their intimate partners (but did not kill them) observe that one 
of the most common excuses they gave for their violence was that they were 
“out of control.”94  Several factors, however, suggest that they simply failed 
to control themselves rather than being truly unable to do so.  First, evidence 
demonstrates that these batterers engage in risk-weighing behavior, which 
contradicts their loss of self-control account, as they admittedly experience 
similar rage in other settings, such as the workplace, but they do not respond 
violently in those settings.95  Second, many batterers state that they did not 
want to hurt their partner seriously, suggesting that they exercised some 
measure of control over the degree of violence used.96 
In an oft-cited 1997 article, Professor Nourse argues that laws’ reliance on 
the loss of self-control theory is problematic because it masks normative 
questions about which types of losses of self-control warrant mitigation.97  
Nourse further contends that defendants deserve the law’s compassion only 
if they stand on equal normative position vis-à-vis their victims.98  Coining 
the phrase “warranted excuse,” Nourse suggests that mitigation might be 
warranted only if the defendant reacted violently in response to some 
unlawful act committed by the victim, one that the law independently 
 
 90. For a comprehensive summary of the scholarly critique, see generally id. at 283–99. 
 91. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1335–36; see also Gruber, supra note 89, at 283–99. 
 92. See Gruber, supra note 89, at 294. 
 93. See id. (“[M]en who killed their partners in response to threatened or attempted 
separation were extremely successful at getting their provocation claims to the jury.”). 
 94. See Coker, supra note 47, at 75. 
 95. Id. at 95. 
 96. Id. at 96. 
 97. See Nourse, supra note 23, at 1369–70. 
 98. See id. at 1396. 
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punishes.99  But if the provocative incident is not in itself criminal, she 
continues, the murder charge should not be mitigated to manslaughter, 
especially when a woman was killed by her male intimate partner after 
pursuing legal action in attempting to end the relationship.100  Nourse 
concludes that the provocation defense should be denied in such cases 
because it is normatively unwarranted and sends the wrong message to 
women to stay with controlling spouses in unwanted relationships.101 
Two decades after Nourse’s scathing critique, courts continue to instruct 
juries on manslaughter charges in circumstances where mitigation is 
unwarranted from a normative perspective.  A 2012 New York Court of 
Appeals decision poignantly demonstrates the implications of the law’s 
continued reliance on an overly expansive view of a defendant’s loss of self-
control.  The highly disturbing facts underlying the decision in People v. 
McKenzie102 show that the defendant stabbed his girlfriend with a knife forty-
seven times following a heated verbal confrontation between them about the 
victim’s admission that she was sexually unfaithful and her refusal to engage 
in sexual relations with the defendant.103  The defendant retrieved a knife 
from the kitchen and, as the argument escalated into a physical altercation, 
repeatedly stabbed her to death.104  Shortly after, the defendant admitted the 
killing to a friend, claiming that it was the result of loss of self-control as he 
had “just snapped.”105  That friend testified that the defendant appeared 
“spaced out” and “out of it” at the time of the incident.106  In a 911 call 
explaining to the dispatcher what had happened, the defendant also said that 
he had “just lost it” and had “blacked out.”107 
The trial court refused to instruct the jury on manslaughter, reasoning that 
while the manner of the repeated stabbing of the victim was indicative of the 
defendant’s loss of self-control, there was no evidence that the defendant had 
a mental infirmity that fell short of a mental disease or disorder, as the EMED 
defense requires.108  The jury convicted the defendant of second-degree 
murder and the defendant appealed.109  The Court of Appeals agreed with the 
defendant that a jury instruction on manslaughter should have been given.110  
The court stressed that the extreme emotional disturbance defense does not 
hinge on evidence of an underlying psychiatric disorder and that courts use 
the term “mental infirmity” in the broader sense, referring to “any reasonably 
 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. at 1334. 
 102. 976 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2012). 
 103. Id. at 219. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 220. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 220–21. 
 109. Id. at 219. 
 110. See id. at 220. 
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explicable emotional disturbance so extreme as to result in and become 
manifest as a profound loss of self-control.”111 
The court’s conclusion that the subjective component of the EMED 
defense—the defendant’s loss of self-control—was satisfied is hardly 
problematic.  Indeed, the evidence introduced at the defendant’s trial 
established that, as a result of his rage over his girlfriend’s admission of 
infidelity, he became extremely angry.112  Moreover, the court correctly 
notes that nothing in EMED’s statutory language suggests that the 
defendant’s emotional disturbance ought to rise to the level of mental 
infirmity.113  My critique of the court’s decision therefore does not take any 
issue with the first part of the holding.  But the second part of the decision 
regarding the objective inquiry into whether there was a reasonable 
explanation or excuse for the defendant’s extreme emotional disturbance is 
deeply troubling. 
In addressing EMED’s objective requirement that the evidence should 
support the inference that there was a reasonable explanation for the 
defendant’s emotional disturbance, the court stated that the jury could have 
plausibly concluded that the victim’s rejection of the defendant, along with 
her verbal disclosure of infidelity, “precipitated not just ordinary anger or 
even rage, but an onrush of emotion leaving the defendant bereft of self-
control.”114  The court then concluded that the question of the reasonableness 
of the explanation is a question of fact that should have been left to the 
jury.115  By that, the court implied that the victim’s admission of sexual 
infidelity might qualify as a “reasonable explanation or excuse” for the 
defendant’s emotional disturbance.  This position evokes archaic notions of 
alleged violation of male honor, perpetuating long-discarded views that 
women’s sexual infidelity excuses male violence.116 
The court’s position that the reasonableness of the defendant’s explanation 
ought to be decided by the jury as a question of fact is misguided.  Instead, 
the court should have concluded that the defendant’s claim that the victim 
sexually rejected him and disclosed her sexual infidelity (a perfectly legal 
course of action) is insufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute a “reasonable 
explanation or excuse” for the defendant’s emotional disturbance.  A judicial 
statement that the defendant’s loss of control claim ought to be denied on 
legal rather than factual grounds is normatively necessary and based on sound 
public policy reasons.  The court should have explicitly rejected the claim 
that extreme rage over an intimate partner’s sexual infidelity can be 
considered an objectively reasonable explanation for the defendant’s 
emotional disturbance.117 
 
 111. Id. at 221. 
 112. Id. at 219. 
 113. Id. at 220–21. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 221–22. 
 116. See Susan D. Rozelle, Controlling Passion:  Adultery and the Provocation Defense, 
37 RUTGERS L.J. 197, 199, 205 (2005). 
 117. Id. at 219. 
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Moreover, the court’s decision to let the jury decide whether the 
defendant’s explanation for what the court refers to as being “bereft of self-
control” improperly justifies mitigation.  It conveys a highly disconcerting 
message to the jury.  It embodies a problematic normative statement that 
implies that there are circumstances where a woman’s sexual taunting of a 
man is so severe as to deprive him completely of self-control and that the 
jury may plausibly consider her behavior as a reasonable explanation for his 
lethal violence.118  Furthermore, this holding not only conflates EMED’s 
subjective and objective inquiries but also practically obliterates the 
defense’s necessary normative aspect.  Under EMED, the defendant’s loss of 
self-control alone is never sufficient to satisfy the defense’s elements.119  
Rather, it must be supplemented with an objective component, namely, proof 
that there was “a reasonable explanation or excuse for the defendant’s 
emotional disturbance.”120  In McKenzie, however, the court’s analysis 
focused solely on the reasonableness of the explanation from the defendant’s 
viewpoint,121 which not only de-emphasized the objective element but also 
stripped the defense of any normative dimension. 
In addition, the argument that the loss of self-control theory results in an 
overinclusive application of the provocation defense stands even without 
embracing the feminist critique.  Gender-neutral arguments similarly support 
the conclusion that the theory is overly broad, as it might result in partial 
mitigation where it is unwarranted from a normative perspective.  As 
Professor Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff notes, control failure is a 
psychological concept that is primarily observational, catching within its 
wide net a host of actors whose conduct may fairly be described as “out of 
control.”122  As an empirical matter, the argument continues, many offenders 
may be viewed as having lost their self-control, yet the criminal law is 
unwilling to partially excuse them.123  Notably, highly intoxicated 
perpetrators who killed while under the influence of drugs or alcohol have 
similarly lost their self-control, yet the law rarely reduces their punishment 
on these grounds.124  Hollander-Blumoff suggests that the criminal law 
 
 118. Cf. People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976) (giving a voluntary manslaughter jury 
instruction for the defendant who killed his wife after she sexually taunted him and admitted 
infidelity).  For a critique of the Berry decision, see CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE 
REASONABLE MAN:  PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 17–19, 43–45 (2003). 
 119. People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1316 (N.Y. 1980). 
 120. Id. 
 121. People v. McKenzie, 976 N.E.2d 271, 220–21 (N.Y. 2012). 
 122. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 26, at 505, 510 (noting the difference between 
self-control in psychology and criminal law). 
 123. Id. 
 124. While most jurisdictions refuse to recognize defendants’ voluntary intoxication as a 
defense to a crime, some jurisdictions do recognize it as a defense to those crimes requiring 
the mens rea of knowledge or intent.  In some states, the defendant’s voluntary intoxication 
may be a partial defense to crimes that require specific intent or a mens rea of purpose or 
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underestimates the situations in which perpetrators have lost their self-
control because its conception of control failure is normative and socially 
construed, whereas psychologists use overly broad and descriptive 
definitions of control failures.125 
Indeed, the main problem with an overly broad understanding of the loss 
of self-control theory is that it lacks any prescriptive dimension, which may 
provide some guidelines for deciding who among actors who have lost self-
control might deserve mitigation of punishment from a normative standpoint.  
Since criminal excuses are generally predicated on society’s normative 
evaluations of defendants’ behaviors, the broadly defined loss of self-control 
theory proves misguided for that purpose.126  One reason for the misguidance 
is that the theory focuses on the effect of intense emotions on defendants’ 
violent behavior.  Such a descriptive account cannot meaningfully contribute 
to understanding the cause behind the behavior.  Instead, a plausible way to 
distinguish among different types of actors who have lost self-control is by 
shifting the emphasis from the effect of behavior to its cause and evaluating 
the behavior from a normative standpoint.  This point is revisited in Part IV.B 
by considering adding a requirement that would limit the application of the 
provocation defense in circumstances where the deceased committed no legal 
wrong.  For the moment, it is sufficient to acknowledge that society might be 
willing to offer some leniency only if lethal violence is caused by somewhat 
understandable reasons. 
B.  Loss of Self-Control Theory Is Underinclusive 
The critique of provocation’s loss of self-control theory on overbreadth 
grounds has been so influential that it eclipsed the fact that this theory 
sometimes proves too narrow for certain types of perpetrators, including 
female defendants whose behavior does not comport with the perceived 
image of a loss of self-control.127  To date, however, commentators have yet 
to acknowledge that the loss of self-control theory may also be 
underinclusive in some circumstances. 
Exposing this hidden dimension of the loss of self-control theory is 
especially imperative because underinclusiveness concerns are arguably 
more troubling than overinclusiveness ones.  An overly narrow 
understanding of loss of self-control creates a threshold that might foreclose 
the only way of giving jury instructions on manslaughter.  If courts find that 
the subjective loss of self-control requirement is not established, the 
objective requirement, which is much harder to satisfy, will likely not be met 
and the provocation claim may not be brought before a jury.  In contrast, an 
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 125. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 26, at 504–05. 
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overly broad construction of provocation’s subjective prong neither dictates 
the final outcome of the case nor necessarily results in unwarranted 
mitigation.  The defendant’s loss of self-control is never, in itself, a sufficient 
basis for mitigation.128  Under all formulations of the defense, an additional 
objective element is required, whether it is an inquiry into the adequacy of 
provocation or into the reasonableness of the explanation for the emotional 
disturbance.129  Therefore, the harms of refusing to consider mitigation if 
provocation is too narrowly construed far exceed the harms of giving juries 
more manslaughter instructions.  Such harms are especially pronounced in 
our current criminal justice system, whose sentencing laws are excruciatingly 
harsh, including mandatory minimums for offenders convicted of murder 
charges.130  Moreover, the consequences of excluding manslaughter jury 
instructions are particularly detrimental for defendants of color who 
comprise a majority of murder defendants.131 
Several reasons support the argument that the loss of self-control theory 
often proves underinclusive.  The theory mostly envisions an enraged actor 
who experiences an uncontrollable impulse to react violently immediately 
following a sudden provoking incident.132  This view, however, provides 
only a partial account of provoked killers.133  It fails to take into consideration 
the typical reactions of certain types of provoked killers whose behavior does 
not externally manifest as loss of self-control.134  People may be provoked to 
act violently in a wide range of situations, for which the loss of self-control 
theory does not account.135  Consequently, jury instructions on manslaughter 
are not given in a host of circumstances, precluding potential mitigation for 
defendants when it might be normatively warranted. 
To begin, the loss of self-control theory does not neatly fit within situations 
in which defendants were provoked to kill by emotions other than anger.  The 
theory is largely predicated on the emotions of anger and rage, failing to 
recognize other intense emotions such as fear and desperation.136  
Historically, anger was perceived as the righteous response of a man whose 
honor, judged by masculine norms, had been wrongly violated by the 
deceased, leading the actor to respond physically and angrily.137  Today, 
provocation continues to be perceived mostly as an anger-based defense due 
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to the prevalence of the loss of self-control paradigm.138  Ample 
psychological research supports the behavioral effects of anger on a person’s 
ability to maintain self-control, finding a strong connection between anger 
and reactive aggression.139  The notions of anger and loss of self-control are 
closely linked, operating as cause and effect in triggering provocation; anger 
is the cause for the defendant’s behavior and its effect is loss of self-control. 
Scant scholarly attention has been given to the fact that fear is another type 
of intense emotion that might trigger provocation.  In a 1986 student 
comment, Lauri J. Taylor critiques the provocation defense as being overly 
narrow, failing to provide mitigation to provoked women who kill abusive 
intimate male partners out of fear.140  Taylor argues that men typically react 
to provocative incidents caused by the deceased with anger, whereas women 
typically react to the deceased’s behavior mostly with fear, depression, and 
sadness.141  Provocation stemming from women’s fear may be cumulative, 
differing from men’s sudden anger that leads them to kill immediately.142  
Taylor concludes that the provocation doctrine privileges men’s anger over 
women’s fear.143  Taylor’s argument that current understanding of 
provocation is too narrow largely remains underdeveloped in the literature.  
Instead, the opposite argument that the loss of control theory is overly broad 
took hold.144 
Taylor’s critique, however, is only partially correct.  She is right that the 
anger-based understanding of provocation disadvantages women 
perpetrators who sometimes kill domestic abusers in nonconfrontational 
situations, out of fear for their lives, and that provocation laws privilege anger 
over other emotions.  But Taylor is wrong in making the essentializing 
assumption that all women are always provoked to kill by fear while all men 
are always provoked by anger.  Granted, it may be empirically correct that 
some women kill male partners who physically abused them out of fear rather 
than out of mere anger.  But in reality, some women kill out of anger and 
jealousy, just like some men kill out of fear.145  Case law demonstrates that 
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defendants who are provoked to kill by fear are often men who kill other men 
in social encounters such as “drug deals gone sour.”146  The essentializing 
claim that women necessarily kill out of fear and men necessarily respond in 
raging anger is therefore not only misleading but it also impedes doctrinal 
developments that would extend the provocation doctrine to additional types 
of defendants, male and female.147 
Instead, the gender-neutral argument advanced here is that the loss of self-
control theory is underinclusive because it accommodates mostly 
defendants—men and women—who act out of anger, failing to provide a 
basis for mitigation for defendants—both male and female—who act out of 
fear.  The law ought to recognize fear-based provocation and acknowledge 
that the implications of recognizing such a defense extend above and beyond 
familiar gender-based dichotomies, including, among others, 
accommodating the experiences of men who kill other men out of fear in 
circumstances falling short of self-defense.148  Recognizing provocation 
triggered by powerful emotions beyond anger requires abandoning the loss 
of self-control theory, which mostly fits behavioral features typical of angry 
actors, rather than fearful or desperate ones. 
Another reason why the loss of self-control theory is underinclusive is that 
it fails to capture the fact that not all provoked actors visibly appear as if they 
have lost their self-control.  When actors are provoked by fear, rather than by 
anger, there is often no evidence suggesting that they had lost self-control, as 
their behavior fails to externally manifest the type of reactions that decision 
makers expect people who are “out of control” to exhibit.149  The loss of self-
control theory mistakenly assumes that actors visibly display their emotions, 
making it easy for decision makers to discern whether they had lost their self-
control.  Psychological research, however, shows that people do not always 
display the appropriate emotions before making a decision and that people 
who do not display emotion often have an impaired ability to make good 
decisions.150  The problem is that court decisions often do not take this reality 
into account, treating loss of self-control, instead, as a necessary part of the 
defendant’s state of mind.151  Courts typically rely on defendants’ own 
testimonies, as well as other witnesses’ testimonies, to conclude that the 
defendant’s conduct was neither indicative nor consistent with a loss of self-
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control image that is associated with the provocation defense.152  This one-
dimensional dependence on loss of self-control results in courts’ refusal to 
give jury instructions on manslaughter when defendants are not perceived as 
having been provoked because they failed to exhibit an angry state of 
mind.153 
The problem is further exacerbated in circumstances where provoked 
killers appear calm and composed.  Yet, the psychological reaction of 
suppressing emotions explains why it is fairly common for defendants to 
visibly exhibit behavior suggesting that they are in control.154  Research 
shows that emotions are often suppressed only to reoccur at a later point in 
time.155  While some actors might respond immediately following a 
provoking incident, others may be successful at suppressing intense emotions 
at the moment of the incident, thus not appearing to have lost self-control.156  
Relatedly, another typical emotional reaction involves rumination on the 
provoking incident, as individuals may keep ruminating on the incident for a 
while, only to react to it later on.157  Psychological studies further find that 
when these intense emotions subsequently resurface, they might be even 
more powerful than their original manifestation.158  This explains why 
defendants’ fear and anger, which initially might have been successfully 
suppressed for a long period of time, could not have been tamed and 
regulated any longer, resulting in lethal violence. 
Another reason why the loss of self-control theory often proves 
underinclusive lies with the fact that it is premised on the assumption that 
defendants were suddenly provoked and overwhelmed by instantaneous, 
unexpected anger that caused them to immediately erupt in a violent attack.  
The theory’s emphasis on the suddenness of the provoking incident assumes 
that a temporal requirement is embedded in the provocation defense.159  
Indeed, manslaughter statutes in many jurisdictions require that the 
provocation is caused by a sudden, inflammatory incident.160  This vision of 
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emotions’ immediate effect, however, is not always accurate because 
provocation is often cumulative.161  The notion of cumulative provocation 
refers to the idea that emotional arousals stemming from anger, fear, 
desperation, and hopelessness may build up over time, culminating in lethal 
violence after the defendant has reached a “breaking point.”162  The loss of 
self-control theory proves too narrow whenever homicides are committed in 
response to cumulative provocation, which are not manifested as a sudden 
loss of self-control and are erroneously interpreted as cold acts of calculated 
revenge, namely, as premeditated killings.163 
The notion of cumulative provocation is buttressed by research findings 
on suppression of emotions that show why individuals who have been 
subjected to multiple emotional arousals react only after reaching a breaking 
point.164  Research also shows that the emotions of anger and fear are 
inextricably linked rather than mutually exclusive to the extent that 
experiencing fear promotes anger, so that if actors fear, they also become 
increasingly angry.165  This research carries practical implications for 
understanding the reactions of provoked killers who might react violently due 
to the combined effect of multiple provoking incidents rather than a single 
and sudden event.  However, courts often refuse to give manslaughter 
instructions in cases where there is no evidence showing that the defendant 
suffered a sudden, unanticipated loss of self-control.166  Many jurisdictions 
explicitly reject the notion of cumulative provocation, insisting that the 
defendant’s passion must be sudden and caused by the deceased’s highly 
provoking act.167 
The requirement that the defendant’s emotional arousal results from a 
single and sudden provoking incident might seem plausible where the parties 
have never met prior to the altercation at issue, such as a road rage incident 
or a drunken bar brawl, or where there is no tumultuous history or intimate 
relationship between them.168  In contrast, in circumstances where the 
defendant and the deceased have known one another prior to the encounter 
preceding the killing, case law demonstrates that provoking behavior patterns 
may develop over considerable time as opposed to sudden and heightened 
instigative situations which manifest in a single moment of loss of self-
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control.169  Provocation in these cases is not caused by a sudden, single 
reaction but, instead, by a culmination of a series of provoking incidents. 
Cumulative provocation is particularly prevalent in circumstances 
involving intimate partner battering.170  The most common reason 
domestically abused individuals kill their batterers is a misperceived need for 
self-protection, namely overreaction to a threat that cannot meet self-
defense’s strict requirements.171  Recognizing cumulative provocation is 
essential, especially in circumstances where the defendant and the deceased 
have been involved in a long-term physically abusive relationship, consisting 
of tension-building scenarios, where repeated provocative incidents have 
progressively built up in a slow burn reaction that culminated in homicide.172  
Provocation law’s continued reliance on the loss of self-control theory, which 
fails to acknowledge this gradual process, therefore hinders any doctrinal 
development of the notion of cumulative provocation.  Rejection of this 
theory is thus a necessary measure for accommodating provocation’s 
cumulative effect. 
C.  Loss of Self-Control Theory’s Rejection in the Insanity Defense Context 
An analogy to the related doctrine of the insanity defense further supports 
my contention that provocation’s loss of self-control theory is flawed.  Loss 
of self-control is not a concept distinct to the provocation defense’s realm.  
One of the tests for the insanity defense is also predicated on defendants’ lack 
of self-control, namely, substantial impairment in volition.173  The essence 
of this test is that perpetrators who are found to be legally insane are 
perceived as unable to exercise self-control over their behavior and they are 
therefore not subject to criminal penalty.174 
The law’s treatment of defendants who suffer from mental disorders that 
affect their ability to control their conduct has considerably fluctuated over 
the years, first towards recognizing a volition-based test as one basis for the 
insanity defense but later shifting away from such test.175  Historically, 
volition-based tests were not a part of the insanity defense, which was limited 
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to include only defendants’ cognitive incapacity.176  Under the M’Naghten 
test, adopted in all U.S. jurisdictions, defendants were deemed legally insane 
if they were incapable of knowing the nature and quality or understanding 
the legal or moral wrongfulness of the criminal act.177  The cognitive-based 
insanity defense was subject to extensive critique, on the grounds that it was 
too narrow, accommodating only defendants suffering from psychoses and 
ignoring a host of other mental disorders that affect defendants’ ability to 
control their conduct.178 
Heeding this criticism, most states, as well as federal courts, expanded 
their insanity defense by adding an inquiry into defendants’ capacity for 
volitional control.179  Broadly stated, laws adopted one of two types of 
control-based insanity tests.  The earlier of the two, often referred to as the 
“irresistible impulse” test, provides that the defendant may be found legally 
insane if, as a result of a mental disorder, he or she acted from an irresistible 
and uncontrollable impulse and had lost the power to choose between right 
and wrong to avoid committing the act.180  The MPC advocated a broader 
control-based test, under which an actor may be found legally insane if, as a 
result of a mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to 
appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law.181  While different jurisdictions use 
various formulations for their volition-based insanity defenses, the notion of 
impairment in the capacity for self-control plays a prominent role under any 
of these tests.182  The underlying idea behind all volition-based tests is that 
actors whose mental disorders affected their ability to exercise self-control 
will not be responsible for their criminal conduct. 
In the past three decades, however, the volition-based test of the insanity 
defense was subjected to fierce scholarly attack.183  The application of the 
test proved problematic given questionable acquittals, most notably that of 
John Hinckley, who was acquitted of the attempted assassination of President 
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Reagan, despite extremely thin evidence that Hinckley was unable to control 
his conduct.184  The public perceived these acquittals as unwarranted, 
blaming the insanity defense’s volition-based test as the primary culprit. 
Scholars critique the control-based insanity test mainly due to the lack of 
scientific research that is capable of distinguishing inability to exercise self-
control from simply failing to control behavior.185  Professor Stephen Morse 
is the most prominent critic of control-based tests, arguing that courts should 
reject altogether the notion of an “uncontrollable” urge or any other purported 
loss of control as a basis for the insanity defense.186  Morse contends that the 
loss of self-control criterion for the purpose of determining criminal 
nonresponsibility is “conceptually unclear, scientifically and clinically 
unverifiable, and practically unworkable.”187  Morse further suggests that 
only a defect in the capacity for rationality can work as a coherent 
nonresponsibility criterion.188  He thus advocates replacing the loss of self-
control test with a lack of capacity for rationality to determine legal 
insanity.189 
Additionally, Professor Richard Bonnie notes that the main problem with 
control-based tests is that psychiatrists do not believe they have a sufficient 
scientific basis for measuring a person’s capacity for self-control or for 
calibrating the impairment of that capacity.190  The American Psychiatric 
Association opined that “[t]he line between an irresistible impulse and an 
impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight and 
dusk.”191  Bonnie concludes that, since psychiatrists are unable to draw a 
meaningful line between control incapacity and control failure and between 
different degrees of impairment, there is no objective basis for legally 
distinguishing between offenders who were undeterrable and those who are 
merely undeterred.192 
As a result of this critique, control-based insanity tests fell out of favor and 
the tide turned against them.  The upshot was that many jurisdictions 
amended their laws by abolishing these tests, leaving intact only cognitive-
based tests as bases for acquitting defendants on legal insanity grounds.  
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Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 685 (1983). 
 192. See Bonnie, supra note 190, at 197. 
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Today, in about half of the states, defendants’ volitional impairment is not an 
independent basis for exculpation.193 
The decline of volition-based tests for the insanity defense provides a 
cautionary tale that casts doubt on the continued reliance on the loss of self-
control theory as underpinning provocation doctrine.  Provocation’s loss of 
self-control theory squarely hinges on the same problematic theory that 
underlies the insanity defense’s volitional impairment test.  Surprisingly, 
however, while most commentators agree that volition-based insanity tests 
are deeply problematic, they rarely reach a similar conclusion regarding the 
reliance on the loss of self-control theory in the provocation defense or call 
for an overhaul of the defense’s doctrinal basis.194  However, drawing an 
analogy from the convoluted history of the rise and fall of control-based 
insanity tests sharpens the intrinsic flaws embedded in provocation’s loss of 
self-control theory, which remains fraught with the same drawbacks 
characterizing volition-based insanity tests. 
In both the provocation and the insanity defense realms, there is no 
psychological or psychiatric basis for accurately demarcating the line 
between genuine impairment in capacity to exercise control and simple 
failure to do so.195  The loss of self-control concept is indeterminate because 
it captures both of these circumstances, where arguably only incapacity to 
exercise control should provide grounds for mitigation.  Another 
shortcoming that characterizes the loss of self-control theory is that the 
precise degree to which defendants ought to experience impairment in their 
capacity for self-control remains unclear.  To successfully raise the 
provocation defense, some jurisdictions go as far as requiring the defendant 
to lose self-control completely.196  Courts in these jurisdictions stress that for 
provocation to be objectively reasonable, defendants must establish that they 
had lost all control and were unable to refrain from committing the 
homicide.197  In other jurisdictions, however, severe impairment in the ability 
to exercise self-control, falling short of complete incapacity, may suffice to 
prevail on a provocation claim.198 
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Moreover, the starkly different treatment of the same loss of self-control 
theory under the provocation and insanity doctrines creates a conceptual 
inconsistency that is hard to reconcile.  It remains unclear why a theory that 
has been widely rejected in the realm of the insanity defense continues to 
play a pivotal role under the provocation defense.  Arguably, there are several 
differences between the use of the loss of self-control concept under the 
insanity defense and its use in provocation cases.  The insanity defense 
requires evidence that either defendants completely lost the ability to exercise 
self-control over actions or that such ability was significantly impaired.199  
The provocation defense requires neither complete loss of capacity for self-
control nor substantial impairment in such capacity.200  Instead, it requires 
evidence that an ordinary person in the defendant’s circumstances would also 
have similarly experienced that same powerful emotion that led the defendant 
to lose self-control.201  Moreover, loss of self-control in the insanity context 
serves as a complete excuse, leading to a verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity, whereas the same concept in the provocation context serves only as 
a partial excuse by mitigating charges from murder to manslaughter.202  
Furthermore, an objective inquiry concerning the adequacy of the 
provocation supplements and significantly limits the loss of self-control 
inquiry.203 
Yet, these differences cannot fully account for a vastly different legal 
treatment of the same theory because similar ideas regarding individuals’ 
capacity for control stand at the core of both doctrines.  If the underlying 
theme in both contexts is that the defendant committed the homicide while 
being in an emotional state of inability to exercise control over conduct, there 
is no principled way to explain the different legal position taken under the 
two doctrines.  Furthermore, the provocation defense arguably incorporates, 
through the back door, a theory that has already been mostly rejected in the 
closely related area of the insanity defense.  It remains unclear why 
defendants who suffer from mental disorders that significantly impair their 
capacity to control conduct cannot be excused due to the law’s narrow 
construction of insanity defense, while defendants who do not suffer from 
mental disorders but lose self-control due to overwhelming emotions may be 
partially excused. 
Drawing on insights from the law’s treatment of volition-based insanity 
tests leads to the conclusion that loss of self-control is an unsuitable legal 
concept for both the insanity and provocation defenses.  The main doctrinal 
implication of this analogy is that the law should cease to rely on the 
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misguided loss of self-control theory as underpinning the provocation 
defense and instead replace it with an alternative theory. 
The following Part turns to psychological theories to consider their 
ramifications on the provocation doctrine and to ultimately construct a 
revised defense. 
III.  THE PROMISE OF DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES 
From its inception, the legal concept of loss of self-control that underlies 
the provocation defense was not grounded in any psychological research 
explaining either the mechanisms of individuals’ loss of self-control or the 
scientific meaning of control failures.204  Instead, the notion of loss of self-
control hinged on laypersons’ intuitive and mostly descriptive understanding 
of impulsive and uncalculated behavior.  As Professor Nourse succinctly 
observes, provocation’s loss of self-control theory “purports to depend upon 
[the defendant’s] behavior (lack of self-control), but it never provides a 
behavioral theory” to support it.205 
In recent years, legal scholars increasingly venture into scientific studies, 
considering the implications they might carry for the law, including, among 
others, criminal defenses.  For example, a major area of interest for criminal 
law scholars concerns neuroscience research, as brain imaging techniques 
explain the neuroscientific mechanisms that lead individuals to commit 
violent crimes.206  Examining psychological research for the purpose of 
better understanding criminal conduct and developing criminal excuses, such 
as the provocation defense, in accordance with that knowledge is yet another 
step in this direction. 
A.  Psychological Research on Loss of Self-Control 
In the past two decades, commentators began to explore psychological 
research on loss of self-control to consider its implications for various legal 
doctrines which draw on this notion.207  In a thought-provoking paper, 
Hollander-Blumoff argues that criminal law scholars have neglected to 
consider psychological studies on self-control.208  Drawing on two strands of 
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research, she suggests that these studies carry important insights that support 
a better understanding of the legal concept of self-control.209 
The first strand concerns construal-level theory, which distinguishes 
between low-level construal that is implicated when individuals focus on 
specific details of events happening in the short term and high-level 
construal, where individuals focus on future events in general and abstract 
terms, carefully contemplating their behavior.210  According to psychological 
research, self-control is conceptualized as acting in accordance with high-
level rather than low-level construal.211  This research further establishes that 
regulation of behavior requires people to act in concert with high-level 
construal, which promotes self-control.212  It also finds that individuals 
whose mental representations focus on low-level qualities are less successful 
at exercising self-control compared to individuals who act in accordance with 
high-level construal.213 
A second line of research rests on psychological experiments showing that 
all voluntary effort, including cognitive, emotional, and physical, draws on a 
limited pool of mental energy.214  Since individuals’ self-control is an 
expandable resource, it may be completely depleted once they exert 
significant effort on mental energy.215  This mental strength model of self-
control draws on the phenomenon of ego depletion to explain failures of self-
control.216  Hollander-Blumoff concludes that, in light of these psychological 
studies, criminal law may significantly underestimate the host of 
circumstances in which individuals do not have the ability to control their 
actions.217  But she also recognizes a mismatch between psychology and law, 
as psychological research on loss of self-control is mostly descriptive, 
reflecting empirical reality in psychology rather than a legal and moral 
position, which calls for normative judgments about behaviors.218 
The turn to psychological research to support a better understanding of 
legal concepts is a welcome step in the right direction.219  The psychological 
account of the notion of self-control is critical to explaining criminal conduct.  
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Many types of criminal acts may fairly be characterized as control failures, 
and psychological research describing such failures facilitates clearer 
understanding of what drives criminal behavior.  But psychological research 
on loss of self-control does little to promote a more principled understanding 
of the normative scope of the provocation defense.  Psychological research 
does not contribute much to the legal understanding of excuse defenses, in 
general, and the provocation defense, in particular, because it does not draw 
the normative line between behaviors that warrant mitigation and those that 
do not.220 
In addition, the problems that characterize courts’ reliance on the theory 
of loss of self-control further support the conclusion that this theory 
inadequately supports the legal concept underlying the provocation defense.  
This conclusion calls for considering different strands of psychological 
research that offer a behavioral theory that focuses on the causes for control 
failures rather than merely describing its effects.  Such theory would support 
an alternative legal concept that is more suitable for determining the scope of 
the provocation defense. 
The following sections first examine behavioral psychology research 
concerning judgment and decision-making, specifically, dual-process 
theories.  They then consider their implications for the provocation defense. 
B.  Psychological Research on Dual-Process Theories 
Dual-process theories in general and the notion of impairment in decision-
making processes and judgments in particular are recurring themes in 
cognitive psychology today.221  These theories offer an alternative way of 
understanding individuals’ information processing and reasoning, one that 
rejects the basic premise underlying theories of rational choice and 
deterrence that researchers previously relied upon in trying to understand 
human behavior, including criminal offending.222 
Rational choice theories’ approach to crime, originally developed by 
economist Gary Becker as an economic-based model for understanding 
individuals’ financial decisions, asserts that people are rational actors, 
choosing to commit crime when it provides them with the greatest benefit.223  
Drawing on Bentham’s utilitarianism, these theories hold that criminal actors 
engage in a form of cost-benefit calculus to determine whether to commit a 
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crime.224  Criminologists describe the decision to engage in criminal activity 
as a two-stage process.225  In the “initial involvement” model, individuals 
consider a host of criminal and noncriminal ways of satisfying their goals 
and needs, taking into consideration their personal beliefs and experiences.226  
In the “criminal event” model, actors select among certain situations to 
engage in crime, based largely on the perceived costs and benefits.227 
In the past decades, scholars began to cast doubt on the rational theory and 
deterrence models’ ability to fully explain criminal behavior.228  Leading 
legal theorists, Frank Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, urged the investigation 
of a variety of factors that condition the differential effects of legal threats 
and recognized that a high degree of emotional arousal is one critical factor 
affecting criminal decision-making by eclipsing thought of future 
consequences.229 
Today, ample research demonstrates that people often do not act as rational 
decision makers, instead making errors in their choices and judgments and 
making decisions that are not in their best interests.230  Acknowledging the 
inherent limitations in rational choice models, Nobel laureate Herbert Simon 
coined the concept of bounded rationality to modify previous understandings 
of rational choice models.231  Simon suggests that individuals’ perceptions 
of costs and benefits are limited by their bounded rationality, a concept 
referring to the cognitive, situational, informational, and computational 
limitations that may influence rational decision-making and the shortcuts 
people often take in making decisions.  Importantly, Simon argues that “in 
order to have anything like a complete theory of human rationality, we have 
to understand what role emotion plays in it.”232 
In recent years, behavioral psychologists developed sophisticated dual-
process theories of information processing and reasoning mechanisms to 
consider how individuals make decisions when operating under intense 
emotions, such as anger and fear, and in stressful situations like threatening 
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circumstances.233  While psychologists advanced multiple strands of dual-
process theories (or dual-system models) that focus on different variables, 
their theories all share some key features regarding actors’ decision-making 
and judgment processes.234 
Broadly stated, psychologists identify two types of thought processes 
underlying reasoning and decision-making that constantly compete for 
control of individuals’ actions.235  One type implicates an implicit, automatic, 
fast, uncontrolled, and mostly unconscious thought process, whereas the 
other implicates explicit, reasoned, slow, controlled, and conscious 
thinking.236  In a given conflict between these two opposing forces, the 
automatic, rapid, and partly conscious mode of thinking sometimes overrides 
the intentional, controlled, and deliberate decision-making and, when that 
happens, actors’ behavior is sometimes harmful, not only to their own 
interests but also to others.237  Moreover, research shows that when the 
automatic thought processing is operated, actors tend to rely on a single 
explanation for a situation rather than search and weigh all the evidence to 
find the best possible cause or explanation.238  This type of automatic and 
unconscious process is also closely linked to hidden and implicit biases, 
including availability bias, namely, the tendency to rely on things that people 
immediately think about.239 
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Nobel laureate, economist, and psychologist Daniel Kahneman developed 
the most prominent dual-process theory, challenging previous assumptions 
that individuals always make logical decisions.240  In a groundbreaking book, 
Kahneman differentiates between the intuitive “System I,” which is fast and 
emotional, and the deliberate “System II,” which is slower and more 
logical.241  These conceptual systems process information differently; 
System I “operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no 
sense of voluntary control.”242  It is constantly active, waiting to operate 
immediately, and heavily relies on heuristics and biases.243  For example, 
System I is immediately activated when individuals’ intuitions tell them that 
they are threatened and should run away from danger.244  System II is the 
deliberate system, which allocates attention to effortful mental activities that 
demand it.245  Its operations are often associated with the subjective 
experience of agency, choice, and concentration.246  System II often prevents 
inappropriate impulses from overt expression, as it overrules the impulses 
generated by System I.247 
Kahneman provides an elaborate account of how problems concerning 
individuals’ objectively unreasonable decision-making occur, demonstrating 
that this happens whenever only System I is activated.248  He contends that 
individuals’ decision-making processes often consult both types of thinking 
and that the division of labor between these systems works most of the time, 
as acting on intuitions, feelings, and impressions usually operates well.249  
But Kahneman claims that individuals tend to be overconfident, placing too 
much focus on their intuitions and too little on cognitive efforts that they find 
unpleasant, therefore tending to avoid them as much as possible.250  When 
situations become more complex, they demand the involvement of System 
II, which intervenes by correcting or replacing the erroneous intuitive 
judgments generated by System I.  In these circumstances, Kahneman 
continues, a conflict between the dual systems arises, resulting in erroneous 
judgments that occur when System II fails to get activated and correct 
decisions triggered solely by System I.251  This happens because System II 
calls for deliberate activation and, since it requires effort and attention, it 
cannot last for long periods of time.252  System II becomes lazy as it is 
depleted quickly, sometimes leading individuals to make decisions relying 
 
 240. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011).  There is no 
single dual-process theory but multiple accounts involving the notion of double process 
reasoning with variations among them. 
 241. Id. at 20–21. 
 242. Id. at 20. 
 243. See id. at 19–20. 
 244. Id. at 20. 
 245. Id. at 21. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 24. 
 250. Id. at 45. 
 251. See id. at 26. 
 252. Id. at 21. 
2020] DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES AND PROVACATION 1851 
solely on System I, which is much more prone to making errors in specified 
circumstances.253  One of Kahneman’s key conclusions therefore is that 
individuals’ decision-making and judgments that solely rely on System I may 
result in irrational behavior.254 
A critical part of understanding the concept of actors’ impairment in 
judgment rests on highlighting the intersection of law and emotions in 
general, the causal connection between intense emotional arousal, and dual-
process theories in particular.  Psychologists draw attention to the 
relationship between these theories and the role of emotion—often referred 
to as “affect”255 in psychological jargon—in judgment and decision-
making.256  In the past three decades, research on emotion, judgment, and 
decision-making has considerably developed, examining the mechanisms 
that explain the influence of affect on individuals’ behavior.257  Broadly 
stated, this line of research concludes that emotions constitute powerful, 
pervasive, and predictable drivers of decision-making, implicating the most 
influential decisions in one’s life.258  It further concludes that impairment in 
judgment may sometimes harm others.259 
In the last two decades, psychological research has undergone a significant 
revolution, resulting in acknowledgment of the role that emotions play in 
shaping actors’ thought processes and judgment and affecting their 
behavior.260  Historically, the prevalent view adhered to a dichotomy 
between reason and cognition on one hand and emotions on the other.261  
Emotions were traditionally understood as a threat to rationality, by 
overwhelming and distorting actors’ rational thinking.262  Psychological 
research, however, underwent an “affect revolution,” establishing that reason 
and emotions are not contrasting concepts but rather inseparable components 
of integrative thought processes and alternative decision-making choices.263 
Following this conceptual shift, the contemporary understanding of 
psychologists today is that emotions play a salient role in the course of 
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rational and cognitive decision-making processes.264  Under this view, reason 
and emotion are not opposing forces because emotions influence actors’ 
thoughts and judgments and are shaped by them.265  Put differently, emotions 
are not irrational forces but are in fact rational themselves and there is no 
conflict between them and cognitive-based rational decision-making 
processes.266  While the traditional understanding was that emotions are 
static forces and direct products of certain stimuli, the contemporary view is 
that emotions are complex processes that integrate highly cognitive 
features.267  For example, this recognition of the complex interplay of actors’ 
cognition and their emotion rejects the dated view that anger and fear are 
bursts of negative feelings accompanied by some visceral reactions, adhering 
instead to the understanding that these emotions are integral parts of actors’ 
cognitive thought processes and judgments.268 
One area where intense emotions carry harmful effects on other 
individuals involves the commission of crimes.269  Research on criminal 
behavior shows that criminal decision-making is often affected by emotions, 
sometimes directly shaped by cognitive reactions.270  The affect heuristic 
suggests that people make judgments and decisions by consulting their 
emotions.271  Significant research is devoted to studying the influence of both 
anger and fear on judgment and choices, including the role that fear plays in 
assessing risks.272  Research also demonstrates that when emotional 
influences are unwanted and deleterious, it is difficult to reduce their effect 
through effort alone, even if under certain circumstances, such harmful 
effects can be reduced.273  For example, research establishes that individuals 
sometimes attempt to regulate their emotions by suppressing them.274  Such 
suppression, however, can be counterproductive as emotions can intensify 
the very emotional state one attempts to regulate.275 
Kahneman’s work integrates dual-process theories with psychological 
research on the role that intense emotions play in judgment and decision-
making.  Interweaving these multiple layers of psychological research, 
Kahneman’s project clarifies the ways that emotion-based decisions are 
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made through the use of automatic processing and heuristic reasoning, which 
occur rapidly, unintentionally, and without much awareness.  This account 
explains why intense emotional arousals cause impairments in individuals’ 
judgment and decision-making processes.  Kahneman further elaborates on 
the links between System I and emotions like anger and fear, stressing that 
these intense emotions trigger the automatic, semiconscious, and intuitive 
modes of System I’s thinking.276  He also notes that the amygdala part of the 
brain, whose primary role serves as a “threat center,” is activated in various 
emotional states.277  Specifically, brain imaging conducted on individuals 
reveal intense responses of the amygdala to threatening pictures that they did 
not recognize.  Kahneman further shows that emotional arousals of anger and 
fear are “associative, automatic and uncontrolled” and that they produce 
impulses for protective actions.278  Individuals may not even be consciously 
aware of these emotive experiences, therefore making it difficult to influence 
them.  Kahneman explains that even if System II may “know” that the 
probability of risk is low, that knowledge does not eliminate the automatic 
response of System I, which cannot be turned off.279 
In addition, Kahneman demonstrates how the emotions of anger and fear 
influence individuals’ judgment of probability of events and outcomes.  
Emotions are not only disproportionate to an event’s probability but they are 
also insensitive to the exact level of probability.280  Two key insights that 
Kahneman highlights concern the related phenomena of overestimation and 
overweighting.281  Overestimation happens when people exaggerate the 
probabilities of unlikely events.  Overweighting happens when people assign 
too much weight to unlikely outcomes.  Overestimation of events and 
overweighting of unlikely outcomes are key features of System I and 
therefore account for individuals’ excessive responses to rare events.282  
“Although overestimation and overweighting are distinct phenomena, the 
same psychological mechanisms are involved in both:  focused attention, 
confirmation bias, and cognitive ease.”283 
C.  Implications of Dual-Process Theories for Provocation Law 
Dual-process theories have been extensively applied in the field of 
economic decision-making, as these theories largely focus on the practical 
implications of the two modes of thinking for behavioral economics.284  
Dual-process theories, however, have far broader implications than financial 
decision-making.  Kahneman’s nuanced project includes multiple examples 
that apply dual-process theories in a variety of different contexts, including 
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decision-making of legal actors such as judges.285  These examples 
demonstrate how overreliance on System I’s heuristics leads individuals to 
erroneous thinking and faulty behaviors, including criminal offenses. 
In recent years, criminology researchers began applying dual-process 
theories in an attempt to better understand criminal offenders’ behaviors.286  
One variation of dual-process theory distinguishes between “hot” and “cool” 
modes of thinking,287 describing their influence on criminal decision-
making.  The “hot” form of information processing is the affective, or 
emotion-based mode, whereas the “cool” form is the cognitive, thought-
based mode.288  The emotions of anger and fear are perceived as immediate 
emotions, namely, they are felt at the time of decision, unlike anticipated 
emotions like guilt, regret, or shame that are felt only when the outcomes of 
decisions are experienced.289  This “hot-cool” framework stresses the 
discrepancy between people’s cognitive evaluation of a situation and their 
emotional reaction to it.290  The hot-affective mode, triggered by strong 
emotions, generates impulses that are influenced by variables which play 
only a minor role in cognitive evaluations.  Criminal behavior results from 
the sole operation of the “hot” mode.  Consolidating criminology-based 
application of dual-process theories with research on emotions’ influence on 
decision-making therefore provides important insights into understanding 
one of the paradigm examples of unreasonable behavior, namely, criminal 
wrongdoing. 
While dual-process theories have been applied in multiple areas of study, 
legal scholars have yet to consider their implications for the purpose of 
criminal excuses in general and the provocation defense in particular.291  As 
noted earlier, Morse has long argued that the concept of diminished 
 
 285. Id. at 43–44 (discussing the findings of a study involving eight parole judges in Israel, 
who spent days reviewing applications for parole).  The default decision was denial of parole, 
with only 35 percent of applications approved. Id. at 43.  The study found that about 65 percent 
of requests were granted immediately following the judges’ meals, whereas approvals 
gradually declined in the two hours before the meals, with zero approvals immediately before 
the meals. Id. at 44. 
 286. See Kyle J. Thomas & Jean Marie McGloin, A Dual-Systems Approach for 
Understanding Differential Susceptibility to Processes of Peer Influence, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 
435, 440–41 (2013); Kyle Treiber, A Neuropsychological Test of Criminal Decision Making:  
Regional Prefrontal Influences in a Dual Process Model, in AFFECT AND COGNITION IN 
CRIMINAL DECISION MAKING 193, 195 (Jean-Louis van Gelder et al. eds., 2014) (Using dual-
process theories, researchers who examine differences in adolescents’ susceptibility to peer 
pressure find that highly impulsive individuals are more susceptible to situational influences 
and immediate considerations and are more likely to rely on the fast and automatic mode of 
processing.). 
 287. Janet Metcalfe & Walter Mischel, A Hot/Cool-System Analysis of Delay of 
Gratification:  Dynamics of Willpower, 106 PSYCHOL. REV. 3, 3–4 (1999). 
 288. See van Gelder, supra note 237, at 170. 
 289. See George Loewenstein & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Role of Affect in Decision Making, 
in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 619, 620–21 (Richard J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003). 
 290. See generally van Gelder, supra note 237. 
 291. But cf. Kenneth W. Simmons, Self-Defense:  Reasonable Beliefs or Reasonable Self-
Control?, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 51, 76–79 (2008) (citing Kahneman’s earlier work on dual-
process theory and discussing its implications for the justification of self-defense, but not 
provocation). 
2020] DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES AND PROVACATION 1855 
rationality underlies both the insanity and the provocation defenses.292  
Morse suggests that a better understanding of control failures causing 
criminal behavior must rest on the notion of defects in the defendant’s 
rationality that are not the defendant’s fault.293 
While the argument that I advance embraces Morse’s rejection of the loss 
of self-control concept as underlying the provocation defense, I depart from 
his suggestion that an alternative conceptualization of criminal excuses 
including provocation ought to rest on the concept of diminished rationality.  
As discussed above, contemporary understanding of emotions is that they are 
not some irrational forces that interfere with actors’ rationality.294  Instead, 
the prevalent view today is that emotions are themselves rational, an integral 
part of complex cognitive processes.  This view further recognizes that 
emotions play a significant role in affecting actors’ decision-making 
processes and their judgments. 
Moreover, Morse’s call to ground excuse defenses in the theory of 
diminished rationality is not supported by insights gained from dual-process 
theories, particularly from the ways these theories conceptualize impairment 
in thought processes and judgments.  Instead of drawing on the concept of 
diminished rationality, the argument below rests on the idea that the 
provocation defense is best understood as grounded in the notion of impaired 
judgment. 
Psychological research on dual-process theories has promising 
implications for considering criminal excuses in general and for revisiting 
the scope of the provocation defense in particular.  Applying dual-process 
theories to the analysis of the provocation defense provides a doctrinal 
construct that substitutes the notion of impaired judgment for the misguided 
loss of self-control theory.  As previously noted, one drawback of the loss of 
self-control theory is that it is not grounded in any psychological theory 
explaining the causes of provoked killers’ behavior.295  The notion of loss of 
self-control merely describes an outcome—control failure—rather than 
focusing on the causes for such failure.  Conversely, dual-process theories 
not only shift the focus away from effect to cause but also provide a 
behavioral theory that cures the apparent disconnect between the legal 
standard for provocation and the psychological research underlying it. 
To be clear, the notions of loss of self-control and impaired judgment are 
conceptually intertwined, representing two sides of the same coin, with the 
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former focusing on provocation’s effect and the latter on its cause.  
Psychological research supports both of these concepts, as they examine 
similar questions from different angles, thus complementing rather than 
conflicting with one another.296  Yet, given the many shortcomings 
embedded in loss of self-control as the legal concept underlying the 
provocation defense, the notion of impaired judgment is better suited for 
understanding the causes for provoked actors’ behavior and for providing the 
governing rationale for the defense.  In particular, the impaired judgment 
concept offers a broader legal construct compared with the loss of self-
control theory.  It covers various behavioral responses that characterize 
different types of provoked killings triggered by a host of intense emotions, 
including ones that the loss of self-control concept fails to capture. 
Dual-process theories provide a doctrinal framework that 
comprehensively account for provoked actors’ thought processes and 
decision-making.  These theories recognize that provoked killers’ thoughts 
and actions are sometimes intuitive, automatic, reflexive, and subconscious 
responses and that intense emotional arousals may affect such reactions.  
They further recognize that when emotions such as anger and fear affect 
actors’ thought processes, their judgment may be impaired and result in 
aggressive reaction.297  Importantly, dual-process theories acknowledge that 
since these emotive processes occur at the subconscious level of awareness, 
rather than being consciously experienced, individuals’ ability to influence 
them is rather limited.298 
Dual-process theories further provide a moral basis and a guiding rationale 
for the provocation defense.  The defense’s main purpose is to draw a legal 
boundary between cold, calculated killings and those that are spontaneously 
affected by extreme emotional arousal and are thus perceived as less 
blameworthy.299  Dual-process theories illustrate the ways that provocation 
cases exemplify the latter and actors’ behavior therefore cannot be deemed 
fully calculated and objectively reasonable.  The key implication of applying 
dual-process theories to the provocation defense is that, since provoked 
killers’ thought processes are intuitive and automatic, their judgment is 
impaired and their ability to influence the operation of such processes is 
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constrained.  Therefore, their fault is arguably diminished, and the degree of 
their criminal responsibility conceivably ought to be reduced. 
Dual-process theories’ fundamental notion of impaired judgment brings 
home the point that thought processes affected by various intense emotions 
significantly impair actors’ judgment and choices.  This may result in 
criminal offending, which is the epitome of faulty judgment and decision-
making.300  Dual-process theories explain why provoked actors kill by 
stressing that their sound judgment is impaired as a result of the intuitive, 
rapid operation of the emotive mode.  This automatic mode of thinking 
accounts for actors’ aggressive behavior, as their judgments and actions 
occur fast, overriding fully reasonable thought processes and judgments.  
Applying the insights of dual-process theories to the provocation defense 
therefore supports the conclusion that provocation cases ought to be viewed 
as one example of impaired judgment where an actor’s thinking was obscured 
and failed to overrule impulsive behavior. 
Dual-process theories further explain the reasons why provoked killers 
make mistaken and objectively unreasonable decisions, as the psychological 
research discussed above shows that overreliance on the intuitive information 
processing system can lead to mistakes.301  This happens because, whenever 
actors’ decision-making is triggered by reflexive thought processes, it 
bypasses the corrective mechanisms that the competing fully reasoned 
thought system offers and prevents the intervention of deliberate and 
calculated modes of thinking.  This type of thought process explains why 
actors sometimes react in a way that seems objectively unreasonable.  Put 
differently, actors sometimes overreact to perceived threats and to certain 
emotional experiences.  While these overreactions are often not objectively 
reasonable, they are nonetheless understandable given the circumstances that 
the actors faced, such as experiencing anger and fear in response to victims’ 
behaviors.302 
Relatedly, another problem with automatic thought processing is its 
association with implicit and hidden biases because provoked actors heavily 
rely on heuristics and biases.303  Among the characteristics of automatic 
thought processing are the phenomena of overweighting and overestimation 
and the fact that actors rely on a single explanation for a situation.304  These 
features explain why actors sometimes kill out of fear, overestimating and 
overreacting to what they mistakenly perceive as imminent threats. 
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The impaired judgment concept thus supports a broader-based theory for 
understanding the provocation defense, compared to loss of self-control, as 
it covers a wider range of circumstances in which actors’ thought processes 
and judgments were impaired, even if their behavior did not visibly manifest 
as loss of self-control.  Recall that one of loss of self-control theory’s 
shortcomings is that it mistakenly relies on a binary dichotomy under which 
people are either in complete control or “out of control.”305  Psychological 
research, however, shows that individuals’ behavior rarely falls under such 
twofold division.  Psychologists believe that “people think, decide, and react 
to other people along a continuum of processes [ranging] from automatic to 
controlled.”306  Impaired judgment theory is better suited to capture provoked 
killers’ judgment and decision-making because it recognizes that their 
behavior encompasses a continuum of processes, rather than a momentary 
control failure.  This position aligns with the understanding that provoked 
actors kill because their judgment might have been significantly impaired, 
even if not completely destroyed. 
Another implication of reliance on the notion of impaired judgment as 
underlying provocation cases is that it provides a proper doctrinal framework 
for recognizing cumulative provocation, which the loss of self-control theory 
fails to do.307  As noted earlier, conceptualizing the provoked actor as 
someone who temporarily loses self-control mistakenly envisions a single 
moment in time in which control is lacking.308  Psychologists, however, 
dismiss such static view, observing that emotional responses do not 
necessarily occur at a single, discrete moment but rather may evolve over 
time.309  The concept of impaired judgment encompasses this understanding 
as it does not adopt a limiting temporal requirement.  Instead, it rests on the 
idea that judging and acting upon these judgments involve an aggregate 
process rather than a static moment.  The more expansive concept of impaired 
judgment supports the conclusion that actors’ thought processes and 
judgments can be impaired due to the cumulative effect of multiple 
provoking incidents. 
Relatedly, another drawback in the loss of self-control theory lies with its 
restrictive cooling-off element, which assumes that shortly after experiencing 
intense emotional arousal, people regain self-control.310  This assumption, 
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however, is mistaken, as psychologists recognize that a person’s thought 
processes and judgments may remain impaired long after a provoking 
incident.311  Psychologists further stress that provocation may “linger, fester, 
and reactivate” over time.312  As previously noted, this perpetual effect is 
especially common in situations involving domestic abuse.313  The notion of 
impaired judgment, which denies that passage of time and necessarily leads 
to the actor’s regaining reasonable thinking, is thus better suited for 
recognizing a long-lasting provoked state, resulting in continuous 
impairment in judgment. 
Finally, unlike the loss of self-control theory, impaired judgment theory 
recognizes a host of other emotions beyond anger that similarly impair 
thought processes and judgment.  Such emotions include fear, desperation, 
extreme sadness, and hopelessness.314  Additionally, the loss of self-control 
theory assumes that a single emotion, namely anger, operates exclusively in 
a provoking incident.  In reality, however, emotions are not always mutually 
exclusive and may also transform over time.315  For example, defendants who 
have been subjected to prolonged physical abuse at the hands of the deceased, 
may concurrently experience not only anger at the deceased but also fear of 
future physical harm.316  Dual-process theories recognize that actors may 
simultaneously experience more than a single emotion that impairs their 
judgment.  In sum, dual-process theories accommodate the pervasive effects 
that intense emotions have on individuals’ decision-making and judgment, 
sometimes resulting in criminal behavior.  The theories’ understanding of 
actors’ impairment in decision-making processes and judgment is thus better 
suited than loss of self-control theory to support the provocation defense. 
IV.  REINVIGORATING PROVOCATION’S NORMATIVE DIMENSION 
As noted earlier, one of the pitfalls of the loss of self-control theory is the 
fact that it purports to rest on a behavioral theory, but it is not buttressed by 
any psychological research on the causes for loss of self-control.317  The 
previous Part resolves this concern by showing that psychological research 
on dual-process theories supplies the missing behavioral model that supports 
the legal claim of provoked killers and by advocating the replacement of the 
loss of self-control notion with the alternative concept of impaired judgment. 
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Yet, there is another major drawback in the loss of self-control theory that 
dual-process theories, standing alone, are unable to rectify.  While these 
theories provide a behavioral account of the causes behind provoked killers’ 
actions, they stop short of considering the circumstances under which 
mitigating punishment is normatively warranted.  The concept of impaired 
judgment, in itself, proves insufficient as the sole moral basis for 
provocation’s partial excuse.  Part IV.A addresses the inherent limitations in 
relying on empirical evidence for making normative evaluations, and Part 
IV.B proposes adding a key feature to provocation’s elements that would 
assist juries in making such assessments. 
A.  The Limits of Psychological Empirical Evidence 
A notable trend in recent years is the law’s increasing turn to empiricism, 
namely, jurists’ reliance on empirical scientific evidence to shape law’s 
substance, both for the purpose of interpreting statutes and for deciding 
individual cases.318  Consistent with this direction, criminal law often turns 
to disciplines such as psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and neuroscience to 
make choices relevant to the scope of criminal responsibility.319 
Criminal law’s reliance on empirical research to facilitate development of 
existing doctrines has invaluable advantages.  Historically, criminal law has 
mostly counted on society’s moral intuitions and communities’ shared norms 
in deciding questions regarding the limits of criminal responsibility.320  
Relying on such intuitive positions sometimes resulted in the law getting it 
right, but other times, in inconsistent and unprincipled outcomes.321  
Elaborating on the tremendous advantages that empirically based criminal 
law has over an intuition-based one exceeds the scope of this Article.  
Grounding criminal law in a solid empirical basis is critical not only for 
guiding decision makers to reach fair outcomes in individual cases but also 
for the continued development of defenses in accordance with contemporary 
scientific knowledge.322 
Without minimizing the numerous benefits that empirical psychological 
research in general and dual-process theories in particular carry for 
developing criminal defenses, it is also crucial to raise some concerns 
regarding their intrinsic limitations.323  Psychological models in general and 
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dual-process theories in particular are incapable of providing normative 
guidelines to assist decision makers in determining, based on public policy 
considerations, who among subjectively provoked killers ought to be 
partially excused.  This feature is a central constraint ingrained in attempts to 
rely on empirical evidence to shape the contours of criminal defenses.  This 
is due to the fact that psychological research and criminal excuses have 
completely different goals; psychological research provides a positivist 
account, mostly describing individuals’ behaviors for the purposes of 
diagnosis and treatment.324  Importantly, its goal is not to evaluate who 
among those exhibiting certain behavior are less morally culpable and thus 
deserving of mitigation.  In contrast, criminal excuses such as provocation 
are concerned precisely with determining what types of perpetrators deserve 
more lenient treatment.  Psychologists and criminal jurists therefore speak 
different languages:  while the former focuses on describing behaviors, the 
latter aims to punish perpetrators according to their “just desert,” namely, in 
proportion to their moral culpability.325 
The psychological insights gleaned from dual-process theories, and 
particularly the notion of impaired judgment, are insufficient, standing alone, 
for determining the scope of criminal responsibility.  They broadly apply to 
many forms of criminal offending that the law is unwilling to excuse, even 
partially, as a matter of sound public policy.  While these psychological 
theories are paramount to understanding provoked killers’ behavior, they are 
unable to assist the legal inquiry into the circumstances under which courts 
should instruct juries on manslaughter verdicts.  Dual-process theories, or 
any other psychological theories for that matter, have thus only partial impact 
in shaping the scope of the provocation defense because they leave open the 
question of who among defendants whose judgment was impaired deserve to 
be partially excused.  The point here is not to claim that psychological 
research is irrelevant to provocation but to underscore the fact that it is 
insufficient, in and of itself, to supply a comprehensive theoretical basis for 
the defense.  Impaired judgment theories, therefore, offer only partial 
promise for reconstructing provocation law.  They must be supplemented 
with a principled theory that would not only guide decision makers in 
identifying the types of provoked killers whose punishment ought to be 
mitigated but would also add a limiting mechanism, grounded in normative 
reasons and policy arguments, to constrain the application of the broad 
construct that the impaired judgment concept offers. 
B.  Provocation’s Normativity 
A theory that aims to identify who, among different types of provoked 
killers, might deserve reduced punishment rests on the premise that it must 
be grounded in normatively based inquiries, rather than in empirical 
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psychological evidence.  Such normative assessments are implicitly 
embedded in provocation’s objective dimension, that is its “adequacy” 
element.  The requirement that the provocation be adequate encompasses a 
prescriptive view that evaluates the defendant’s reaction in relation to the 
deceased’s provoking behavior. 
From its inception, the provocation defense included a subjective prong, 
requiring that the defendant kill while in a heat of passion, and an objective 
component, requiring adequate provocation, measured against a reasonable 
person’s standard.326  Today, while adequacy remains an element of the 
provocation defense in all non-MPC jurisdictions, its role has been de-
emphasized.327  The reason lies with the modern trend towards emphasizing 
provocation’s notion of loss of self-control, which has become the heart of 
the defense.328  Focusing mostly on the defendant’s subjective state of mind 
results in underplaying provocation’s adequacy dimension. 
Dual-process theories, with their emphasis on impaired judgment, 
similarly focus on actors’ subjective mental states, as their key inquiry is 
whether defendants’ overwhelming emotions impaired their judgment and 
decision-making.  The concept of impaired judgment is thus only capable of 
addressing provocation’s subjective dimension.  It is unable to provide any 
insights for provocation’s objective aspect because adequacy is essentially a 
normative notion which does not hinge on descriptive accounts of 
defendants’ state of mind.329 
Moreover, strengthening provocation’s normative dimension is necessary 
as a means of offsetting the effect of applying dual-process theories, which 
arguably expands the scope of the provocation defense by recognizing 
additional types of provoked killings.  Revitalizing provocation’s normative 
dimension counterbalances such expansion by limiting the circumstances 
under which provocation would be deemed adequate and by ensuring that 
only defendants whose actions warrant mitigation are able to successfully 
rely on the defense. 
To bolster provocation’s normative dimension, the defense’s elements 
must incorporate some principles that would assist decision makers in 
drawing the line between impaired judgment cases that warrant mitigation 
and those that do not.  These principles ought to encompass intrinsic 
evaluative standards that draw on shared societal norms and values to enable 
decision makers to judge provoked killers’ behavior.330  Their purpose is to 
guide the question of whether society is able to understand provoked killers’ 
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objectively unreasonable behavior and subsequently mitigate punishment.  
This view aligns with a basic tenet of the criminal law, which aims to punish 
only actors who deviate from shared societal norms and expectations about 
proper behavior.331 
There is a consensus among commentators that the provocation defense 
calls for normatively based determinations.332  Professors Dan Kahan and 
Martha Nussbaum’s seminal work on the evaluative conception of emotions 
in criminal law distinguishes between a mechanistic and an evaluative 
conception of emotions in criminal law, advocating for the latter position.333  
The loss of self-control theory, they continue, rests on a mechanistic 
understanding of the emotions.334  Instead, Kahan and Nussbaum place a 
premium on a normative, value-based evaluation of emotions by stressing the 
significance of actors’ motives for engaging in criminal behaviors.335  Kahan 
and Nussbaum’s evaluative conception of emotions recognizes that provoked 
defendants’ actions express an appropriate valuation of the good that is 
threatened by the deceased’s wrongful provocation.336 
Additionally, considering whether provocation law should adopt broader 
mitigating standards, Professor Stephen Morse points out that the scope of 
the provocation doctrine embodies normative questions and that determining 
which cases of impaired rationality are excusable reflect “a socially based 
evaluative judgment that some rationality diminutions . . . are not the 
defendant’s fault.”337  But commentators do not fully elaborate on the 
specific content of provocation’s normative dimension, as the prevailing 
view today is that rigid rules should not dictate what circumstances amount 
to “adequate” provocation, instead leaving the jury to decide these questions 
on a case-by-case basis.338  This view represents a conceptual shift from 
common law where “adequacy” was limited to cover only predefined 
categories embodying the deceased’s wrongdoing evaluated against social 
norms that hinged on violation of male honor according to archaic values and 
prevalent mores of that time.339  After courts recognized that these categories 
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were too narrow, they rejected fixed rules in favor of flexible and fluid 
standards that juries need to apply. 
While the advantages of replacing set rules with elastic standards cannot 
be ignored, there are also downsides to consider.  Since adequacy is a vague 
and overly broad concept, its application risks inconsistencies across the 
board in outcomes of provocation claims.340  While indeterminate concepts 
like adequacy must rely on objective measures for evaluating defendants’ 
behavior, existing laws fall short of filling this abstract term with concrete 
substance.  The removal of rules created a lacuna after juries were left 
without guiding principles on how to apply the amorphous adequacy concept, 
as they were not provided with alternative standards to direct their evaluative 
conclusions.  Consequently, juries are forced to rely on their own moral 
intuitions in deciding whether provocation is adequate.  But communities 
differ on shared moral values, which risks juries applying their personal 
moral intuitions inconsistently in deciding this question.  If, rather than 
making normative and objective determinations based on critical morality, 
juries relied on subjective and positive morality, the result might be 
detrimental to both defendants and victims.341 
Recognizing these difficulties by no means suggests that juries should not 
engage in normative inquiries in evaluating provocation’s adequacy.  Juries’ 
key role, beyond the obvious task of fact-finding, is to decide complex 
normative questions.342  This mission is especially salient in considering 
criminal defenses where juries are the best-suited institutional actors for 
capturing societal norms and shared moral values regarding criminal 
wrongdoing.343  But to assist juries in making normative evaluations 
concerning provocation’s adequacy, I advocate the addition of a key 
component that draws on the idea of contributory responsibility by making 
the deceased’s wrongful act an element of provocation.344  Currently, no 
provocation formulation explicitly makes the deceased’s criminally wrongful 
act an element of the defense.345  While some jurisdictions require, in broad 
terms, “provocation by the victim,” no statutory language unequivocally 
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provides that provocation is adequate only if it stems from the deceased’s 
legally wrongful act.346 
In recent years, commentators have weighed in on the idea of 
incorporating the deceased’s wrongdoing into the provocation defense.  
Requiring that the defendant and the deceased stand on equal moral footing, 
Professor Victoria Nourse contends that manslaughter instructions should 
only be given in cases where defendants react to a grave wrong that the law 
otherwise punishes, denying such instructions to defendants who react in 
response to the victim’s lawful conduct.347  Evaluating the defendant’s 
reaction vis-à-vis the deceased’s wrongful behavior is precisely what makes 
the defendant’s behavior understandable, even if not fully excused.348  
Professor Aya Gruber draws on the idea of relational wrongdoing, 
advocating a general defense based on the victim’s contributory liability for 
the crime.349  Professor Vera Bergelson introduces the notion of 
conditionality of rights to suggest that the deceased’s contribution to the 
offense ought to matter for the provocation defense.350  Other commentators 
disagree with the idea of considering the deceased’s wrongdoing, claiming 
that it is both under- and overinclusive.351 
Drawing on these proposals, I suggest that the deceased’s wrongful act 
ought to be one piece of provocation’s normative dimension.  To be clear, 
introducing evidence that the deceased committed a wrongful act against the 
defendant by no means suggests fully litigating the deceased’s precise role in 
the homicide, including deciding whether such act was indeed committed 
according to evidentiary standards applicable in criminal proceedings.  
Granted, such determinations are neither practically possible given that the 
deceased cannot testify nor normatively warranted given that the law cannot 
hold the deceased criminally accountable.  Instead, I posit that the wrongful 
act element may be proven if defendants introduce evidence that the 
deceased’s provoking behavior caused them to reasonably believe that the 
deceased committed a legally wrongful act against them.352  Incorporating 
defendants’ beliefs that the deceased had criminally wronged them does not 
mean that the test is purely subjective, resting on defendants’ thoughts alone.  
Rather, the jury will decide whether, under defendants’ specific 
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predicaments, taking into account the surrounding circumstances and the 
objective characteristics of both parties, defendants reasonably believed that 
the deceased legally wronged them. 
Some readers might balk at the thought of linking provocation’s adequacy 
to the deceased’s wrongdoing.  Arguably, attributing blame to dead victims 
is problematic given that their account is missing at trial.  This concern may 
be alleviated where other witnesses can shed light on the deceased’s conduct 
preceding the killing.  A more disconcerting difficulty is that taking the 
deceased’s wrongdoing into consideration is incompatible with the criminal 
justice system’s rejection of constructs that attribute blame to victims by 
suggesting that they partially contributed to the crime.353 
Conceding that adding a wrongful act requirement to provocation’s 
elements exacts a certain toll, a cost-benefit analysis suggests that the likely 
benefits of such addition offset its costs.  Incorporating this requirement 
would not only provide juries with much-needed guidance for evaluating 
provocation’s adequacy but also supplement their assessment with the 
missing normative component.  The wrongdoing requirement aligns with the 
underlying rationale behind the provocation defense, namely, that mitigation 
is warranted because provoked killers are less morally culpable than 
unprovoked killers.354  The deceased’s wrongful act is a crucial element that 
explains why some defendants who experienced impaired judgment deserve 
reduced penalty while others do not.  Many defendants commit crimes while 
experiencing impaired judgment, yet neither law nor accepted societal values 
supports mitigation.355  What makes provoked killers deserving of mitigation 
is the fact that they share at least some of the blame with the deceased.  It is 
the deceased’s wrongful act that gives them a justifiable sense of being 
wronged, according to shared community norms, values, and moral 
standards.356  Adding a wrongful act requirement thus supplies the moral 
basis for mitigation because it explains why the defendant had legitimate 
grounds for feeling legally wronged by the deceased’s provoking behavior. 
Further, making the deceased’s wrongdoing an element of provocation 
does not suggest that the homicide is justified, as accepting a provocation 
claim only partially excuses defendants.357  The wrongful act requirement 
embraces a societal norm of relational responsibility that rests on the idea 
that the defendant’s moral culpability is relative rather than absolute, and it 
is determined in relation to that of the deceased’s.  The deceased’s relative 
contribution to the lethal event, combined with the defendant’s reduced 
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moral culpability, draws a normative line between reasons for killings that 
society is willing to understand and those that it is not.  It makes the 
defendant’s lethal reaction somehow understandable—albeit unjustified—in 
communities’ eyes because the defendant is perceived as someone who 
overreacted to the deceased’s wrongful act. 
Adding a wrongful act element also mitigates possible concerns that some 
readers are likely to raise, including that reliance on broad dual-process 
theories overstretches the scope of an already expansive and controversial 
defense, resulting in unwarranted leniency towards dangerous defendants.  
Grounding a criminal defense on these theories may risk flooding the gates 
with questionable psychological testimony aimed at bolstering a host of 
dubious defenses, including the “abuse excuse” and other scientifically 
suspect “syndromes.”358  These concerns are overstated for several reasons.  
First, unlike self-defense, accepting a provocation claim does not lead to full 
acquittal of any crime but instead only mitigates the conviction from murder 
to manslaughter, which carries a reduced, yet still hefty sentence.  Second, 
broadening the doctrinal scope of the provocation defense would not lead to 
the acceptance of all such defensive claims as juries are free to reject them 
on factual grounds.  Finally, while dual-process theories enlarge the doctrinal 
basis for the provocation defense, adding the wrongful act element offers a 
limiting mechanism that counteracts the effect of expansion.  Reemphasizing 
the role of provocation’s normative dimension alleviates any worries that 
reliance on dual-process theories might result in the massive acceptance of 
provocation claims.  The reconstructed defense envisioned here ought to be 
reserved for aberrational situations in which defendants overreacted to 
exceptional circumstances caused by the deceased’s criminal wrongdoing. 
The main implication of adding the constraint of a wrongful act 
requirement is that juries would be instructed that the deceased may not be 
deemed to have committed a wrongful act if they engaged in conduct that 
they had a legal right to pursue.  One notable example in which such 
requirement would limit the scope of the provocation defense concerns 
defendants who killed intimate partners who wanted to terminate the 
relationship and claimed that their partners’ behavior provoked them to 
kill.359  Under contemporary societal norms, any party to an intimate 
relationship may exercise the legal right to end it, for whatever reason.360  
Therefore, the deceased would not be deemed to have committed a wrongful 
act in these circumstances, barring the defendant’s provocation claim.  Since 
provocation’s objective inquiry precedes the subjective one, establishing the 
deceased’s wrongful act would become a prerequisite for considering the 
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subjective test.361  Excluding the subjective inquiry for defendants who did 
not kill in response to wrongdoing on the deceased’s part further sharpens 
the normatively based assessments at the heart of the provocation defense.  It 
sends an expressive message that society is willing to understand, at least 
partially, a defendant’s overreaction to the deceased’s provoking behavior 
only when it was caused by the deceased’s legal wrongdoing.  Put differently, 
while defendants’ overreaction to certain emotional experiences, like anger 
and fear, may not be fully justified or excused, it may nonetheless be 
perceived as an understandable reaction, given the circumstances that 
defendants were facing. 
Moreover, as previously mentioned, commentators extensively criticize 
the gender-based dimension embedded in provocation claims, which 
arguably allow angry males who kill female partners to receive a jury 
instruction on manslaughter but deny such an instruction for fearful women 
who kill abusive partners.362  The position advocated here aims to dismantle 
provocation’s gender-based concerns by adopting a gender-neutral approach 
to the defense.  Killing because of anger, possessiveness, and jealously 
should never be partially excused regardless of the defendant’s gender 
because there is no wrongful act on the deceased’s part, regardless of gender.  
Consequently, this approach would deny recognition of a provocation claim 
to female defendants who kill out of anger, absent any criminal wrongdoing 
by the deceased male.363  But it would also allow male defendants to prevail 
on provocation grounds if they killed a female who committed a wrongful 
act.364 
Making the deceased’s wrongdoing an element of the provocation defense 
calls for both a modification and a clarification.  First, this element ought to 
include not only a single wrongful act but also multiple wrongful acts in order 
to reflect the reality that provoked killers often react to a series of acts by the 
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deceased that might have been committed over an extended period of time.365  
Consider Part II’s discussion of cumulative provocation, which is especially 
salient in cases involving domestically abused defendants who endured 
multiple incidents of physical abuse by the deceased.366  In these 
circumstances, defendants’ actions are triggered not solely by the last abusive 
incident but by the cumulative effect of the deceased’s various wrongful 
acts.367 
Second, the wrongful act requirement must include the deceased’s verbal 
threats to inflict serious physical harm on the defendant.  Since many 
jurisdictions retain the traditional rule that “words alone” do not amount to 
provocation, the deceased’s threats might not be sufficient to meet the 
wrongful act requirement.368  Provocation’s wrongful act element must 
include an explicit verbal threat of physical harm to cover situations where 
defendants appear to overreact to the deceased’s threats but fall short of a 
right to self-defense because the threats were not sufficiently imminent.369  
An imminence requirement is especially problematic in cases where 
defendants were subjected to prolonged physical domestic abuse but killed 
their abusers at a moment when physical confrontation was absent.370  These 
defendants overreact to threats that are not objectively imminent, yet they 
misperceive the threat and overestimate its magnitude and proximity because 
of their impaired judgment.371  Recognizing provocation claims in these 
cases is therefore appropriate from the perspective of sound public policy. 
C.  A Test Case 
The facts underlying the 2015 Kansas Supreme Court decision in State v. 
Brownlee372 may serve as a test case for applying the reformulated 
provocation doctrine advocated above that rests on the theory of impaired 
judgment.  In this case, a male defendant shot and killed a man following a 
verbal argument that deteriorated into physical confrontation stemming from 
the deceased’s touching the defendant’s sister in a sexual manner without her 
consent.373  The trial court refused to instruct the jury on voluntary 
manslaughter, resulting in the defendant’s murder conviction.374  Upholding 
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the conviction, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a voluntary manslaughter 
instruction was not factually appropriate.375  The court reasoned that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove that the defendant had lost self-control or 
acted out of passion.376  There was no sudden quarrel between the defendant 
and the deceased, rather the dispute between them merely “simmered” 
throughout the evening.377 
Brownlee supports my contention that the loss of self-control theory is 
underinclusive, resulting in the provocation defense being too narrowly 
construed.  To instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, Kansas law 
requires evidence of provocation that “cause[s] an ordinary man to lose 
control of his actions and his reason.”378  The loss of self-control theory plays 
a critical part in the court’s problematic interpretation of provocation’s 
elements.  The court placed a heavy premium on the fact that the defendant 
visibly appeared composed during the events that led to the shooting, trying 
to calm other partygoers and diffuse tensions with the deceased.379  This view 
not only downplayed the defendant’s emotional arousal but also 
underestimated the significance of the physical confrontation with the 
deceased.  The court further emphasized the requirement that, for adequate 
provocation, the quarrel must be sudden and rejected the view that the 
defendant experienced cumulative provocation, which gradually simmered 
over the course of the evening.380 
Hypothetically, applying the proposed impaired judgment framework to 
Brownlee would have likely resulted in a jury instruction on voluntary 
manslaughter.  The facts of the case demonstrate that both the objective and 
subjective elements of the proposed provocation defense could have been 
met.  Beginning with the question of the deceased’s legal wrongdoing, the 
evidence shows that it was the deceased’s wrongful act that provoked the 
defendant.  Witness testimony established that the deceased was threatening 
both the defendant’s sister and the defendant himself.  They testified that the 
deceased sexually touched the defendant’s sister and, when her boyfriend 
confronted him, the deceased responded with the threat:  “I’ll smack you . . . 
and your bitch.”381  Witnesses further testified that the deceased also 
threatened that he would “snatch little n—s’ guns and beat ’em with it” and 
that he would be back later to hurt the defendant.382  These statements not 
only constitute criminal offenses, namely concrete threats to inflict physical 
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harm, but also go over and above mere words, which, under Kansas law, do 
not amount to provocation.383 
Additionally, the evidence supports the conclusion that a jury could have 
reasonably concluded that the defendant’s judgment was impaired as a result 
of both the physical confrontation between him and the deceased and the 
deceased’s threatening statements.  The evidence shows that immediately 
prior to the shooting, when the defendant was confronted by the deceased 
outside the house, the initial verbal confrontation between the defendant and 
the deceased escalated into a physical one.  Several witnesses testified that 
the shooting was the culmination of an angry altercation between the 
deceased and the defendant.  One witness testified that it was the deceased 
who initiated the physical altercation, telling the defendant that he wanted to 
fight.384  Given these testimonies, a broader view of provocation, one that 
rests on impaired judgment theory, could have led a jury to conclude that the 
defendant shot the deceased as a result of intense emotional arousal that 
impaired his judgment, that it was triggered by the deceased’s wrongful act, 
and that it would have likely provoked any ordinary person in these 
circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
Mildred Hayes, the protagonist in the film Three Billboards Outside 
Ebbing, Missouri is portrayed not only as an incredibly angry woman but 
also as a deeply grieving victim.385  Admittedly, she has objectively sound 
reasons for experiencing rage and sorrow.  Hayes is the indirect victim of 
heinous crimes perpetrated against her teenage daughter, who was raped and 
murdered and her killer was never found.  Hayes’s fury and frustration with 
the town’s police chief leads her to pay for three billboards in which she 
blames him for failing to bring the perpetrator to justice.  The film depicts 
the transformation that Hayes undergoes from a desperate, sad, and angry 
victim to a ruthless villain, perpetrating a series of violent crimes.  While she 
is initially perceived as a sympathetic victim who expresses understandable 
anger, as the plot unfolds, her character transforms into an unhinged, raging 
woman seeking vengeance.  The film nowhere portrays Hayes as someone 
who just “snapped” and lost self-control.  Instead, her actions seemingly 
express agency and autonomy as she retains her composure, appearing cool 
and carefully calculating violent actions, including a plan for a revenge 
killing. 
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This construction of societal perceptions, which draws on an essentialist 
account about gender identities, is not unique to film.386  The criminal justice 
system is similarly keen on embracing an essentialist narrative of female 
perpetrators by taking a binary approach under which women killers may 
either act out of fear, overreacting to what they perceive as defending 
themselves against imminent deadly attacks, or alternatively as mentally 
deranged, crazy, or unhinged women.387  The “angry woman” is a notion that 
the justice system has difficulty grappling with.388 
This Article reveals the various implications that the loss of self-control 
theory carries for different types of provoked killers.  It shows that this theory 
mostly accommodates the typical reactions of angry perpetrators but fails to 
account for violent actions that are triggered by a host of other emotions.  For 
actors who maintain self-control, whose behaviors do not align with societal 
expectations of how provoked killers normally react, the criminal justice 
system carries especially harsh consequences because it views them as 
calculating, vengeful murderers. 
This Article thus aims to illuminate the flaws of essentialism as they are 
reflected in the provocation doctrine.  It rejects an essentialist account of 
provocation that cuts across gender lines, under which male defendants 
necessarily lose self-control, acting out of anger, whereas female defendants 
act out of fear, overreacting to nonimminent physical threats.  As scholars 
argue, essentialism about identities is usually wrong, and most groups of 
people are defined by various social identities and are thus enormously 
diverse.389  Instead of relying on the familiar dichotomies that underlie 
provocation, this Article urges a gender-neutral view of provoked killers, 
acknowledging that their violence is triggered by a myriad of intense 
emotions over and above anger, including fear, grief, desperation, 
hopelessness, or their combination.  Under this account, women may be 
provoked to kill out of anger while men may be provoked to kill out of fear.  
Moreover, both males and females may kill out of mixed emotions and 
combined motives. 
By applying dual-process theories to better understand the provocation 
defense, this Article offers a doctrinal framework that potentially alleviates 
some of the harsh consequences stemming from mandatory minimum 
sentencing laws for murder convictions, including their disproportional 
effect on racial minorities.390  Additionally, the notion of impaired judgment 
is sufficiently capacious to cover a broad range of circumstances in which a 
 
 386. See Susan Gelman, Psychological Essentialism in Children, 8 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 
404, 404 (2004) (defining essentialism as “the view that certain categories have an underlying 
reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly but that gives an object its identity, and 
is responsible for other similarities that category members share”). 
 387. See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (1994). 
 388. See generally Jessica J. Salerno et al., Closing with Emotion:  The Differential Impact 
of Male Versus Female Attorneys Expressing Anger in Court, 42 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 385, 
387–88 (2018). 
 389. See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THE LIES THAT BIND:  RETHINKING IDENTITY 29 
(2018). 
 390. See Gruber, supra note 89, at 325. 
2020] DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES AND PROVACATION 1873 
variety of emotions beyond anger provoke violent reactions.  This suggestion 
leaves many open questions for future work, including, among others, 
whether the impaired judgment construct might allow mitigation for 
defendants who kill out of mercy and compassion.391  But this Article also 
illuminates the need to place normative limits on the scope of mitigation in 
order to conform with sound public policy considerations.  It acknowledges 
that dual-process theories are only able to provide a partial promise for 
reshaping provocation doctrine and that, at the end of the day, normativity 
governs, as no civilized society is willing to offer leniency to all individuals 
whose judgment was impaired due to overwhelming emotions.  Society’s 
readiness to mitigate murder charges hinges on moral principles 
encompassing contemporary shared community values.  Rethinking the 
moral basis for provocation thus demands that the doctrine rest on moral 
judgments, confirming societal views about which types of killings are less 
morally blameworthy than murder. 
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